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Abstract 
 
 The presented thesis sought to discuss the cult of personality that surrounded Adolf Hitler 
and was functionally part of the Führer myth during the interwar period through a sociopolitical 
lens. In doing so, it addressed the public image of Hitler as he transitioned from simple orator to 
the head of the fascist Third Reich, through the use of propaganda and charismatic authority. 
Hitler had tapped into a völkisch belief in a heroic leader that predated the First World War and 
the distrust of the Weimar Republic and the agents of democracy that had, in the mind of many 
Germans, stabbed them in the back and surrendered them to hostile forces at the end of the war.  
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Introduction 
 
The discipline of history had addressed the interwar period in a variety of way. From 
focusing on political leaders and important generals, to the everyday lives of workers and 
families, historians had assessed through various lenses the history of countries between the First 
and Second World Wars. In the focus on Germany, many historians had focused on the nature of 
the Weimar Republic and Third Reich through multiple lenses. Their arguments presented by 
some influential historians, such as Ian Kershaw, Hans Mommsen, and Karl Dietrich Bracher, 
had been interested in the political, and at times social and cultural, environment of the period. 
The political discussion on the period had been well researched in particular regards to the 
National Socialist German Worker’s Party (NSDAP) and the party leaders, Adolf Hitler in 
particular, but the discussion had focused less on the effects of the party on the German populous 
than the interparty conflicts and policies.1 
The purpose of this thesis was a narrowed view of the NSDAP’s focus on the Führer 
myth and cult of personality that surrounded Hitler during the interwar years, 1918-1939. With 
one major historian, Ian Kershaw, focused on this the discipline is generally void on the topic. 
Kershaw himself focused on the Führer myth though mainly a political means, studying the 
propaganda, speeches, and the response of Germans to it. While mentioning the cult of 
personality, Kershaw’s argument was centered on the nature of the party and Hitler.  This thesis 
was narrowed further than Kershaw’s viewpoint and concentrated in a newer area of study that 
                                                           
1 Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2003), xv-xxxiv. 
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combines the political and social spheres of influence, described as sociopolitical this lens is 
meant to combine the two spheres in order to have a more rounded understanding of the topic. 2 
Within the following chapters, this thesis seeks to prove that the cult of personality that 
surrounded the public image of the NSDAP, also known as the Nazi Party, leader Adolf Hitler 
was influenced by the social factors of interwar period Germany and the political policies and 
failures of the First World War and the Weimar Republic. Central to this argument is the role of 
propaganda, hate, and a charismatic personality that had arrived on the German political scene at 
the right moment. 
 
I. Terms 
In identifying the context of the thesis, a discussion on the terms presented within this 
paper is important. The most major terms to the thesis were interwar, sociopolitical, fascism, 
propaganda, and Führer.  With this paper previously discussing both interwar and sociopolitical 
as functions of this thesis, the other terms were central in the research and writing process of the 
thesis. The Nazi Party was a part of the fascist movement of the early postwar period, with its 
foundation in Italian politics under Galeazzo Ciano, and expanded upon by Benito Mussolini, 
himself a charismatic individual. As a new political movement in the aftermath of the First 
World War, fascism was defined as, “a belief in the bond of nationhood…encapsulated in the 
spirit and personality of common leaders.”3 While fascism was important to the Nazi Party, it is 
also important to note the use of propaganda within the context of the Führer myth. As a key 
component to movement, propaganda could be defined as, “the dissemination of particular 
                                                           
2 Lawrence C. Dodd, “Interwar—Postwar Contrasts,” in Coalitions in Parliamentary Government (Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
3 James Holland, The Rise of Germany, 1934-1941: The War of the West (New York: Grove Press, 2015), 16. 
3 
 
 
 
messages of a dishonest and dangerous kind,” and for the period it was usually used by 
authoritarian regimes to manipulate a large number of people.4 As we will later discuss, 
Propaganda was important to the overall understanding of the cult of personality’s appeal to 
Germans as the interwar period progressed. 
The most major function of this paper centered on the Führer cult that worked within the 
framework of Nazism. The term Führer was important to identifying a key point of this paper, as 
it was the key component in describing the relationship that Adolf Hitler had within the Nazi 
Party. Translated to leader, the term means much more in the context of the party, the Führer 
was described by Nazi propaganda as a, “living embodiment of the German nation, radiating 
strength and single-minded devotion to Germany.”5 As defined, this term served a large function 
within the sociopolitical environment of the party and later the nation as part of the propaganda. 
 
II. Historiography 
With the key terms discussed, it is important to address the historiography in connection 
to the thesis topic. The discussion of Adolf Hitler during the interwar period had focused on the 
politics and military circumstances of his actions. It was in these that historians described the 
reach of his charisma and the Führer myth, with historians some historians arguing that a 
uniqueness of personality or a larger, more distinctive patterning of German culture was at fault 
for the progress of the period.  The earliest discussions on the Hitler’s personalities were in the 
writings of William Shirer, an American journalist during the interwar period, originally 
                                                           
4 Alan Sennett, “Film Propaganda: Triumph of the Will as a Case Study,” in Framework: The Journal of Cinema and 
Media 55, no.1 (Spring, 2014), 46.  
5 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Making a leader,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007817.  
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published in1960.6 Sadly, there were gaping holes in his writings, but several trends could be 
found persisting from his writings concerning the public and political perception of Hitler. Shirer 
described early Hitler as appearing not as an important figure in dress and manners, instead he 
appeared disheveled and unimpressive. This early image was carried through the historiography, 
including a 2012 documentary commenting on the work of an early party leader to refine Hitler’s 
image.7 The discussion on the early functions of the party was described in depth by historians 
and sociologists; one of the earliest non-Germans was Geoffrey Pridham, who published in 1973, 
his text focused on the Bavarian period of the NSDAP. In doing so, he described the obscurity 
and eventual popularity of the small party in the German state, a place where an, “atmosphere of 
disquiet formed the background to the revolutionary,” and problematic political and social period 
after World War I.8 Pridham described Hitler after the refinement of his personal image and held 
that the propaganda and rallies were similar and inspired by Mussolini’s actions in Italy.  
The writings of Shirer and Pridham were a decent understanding of the early 
historiography on the image of Hitler within German history. The number of historians on the 
period was numerous, but in context of the topic of this paper, the cult of personality is a limited 
discussion if addressed at all by historians. While one historian, Englishman Ian Kershaw, had 
decided much of their work to understanding the topic, others would barely note on the cult-like 
adoration that began as a small circle of the Nazi Party and grew to encompass a large portion of 
the Nazi supporters. 
 
                                                           
6 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2011).  
7 The Dark Charisma of Adolf Hitler, directed by Laurence Rees, November 12, 2012 by Netflix, (BBC, 2012).  
8 Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler’s Rise to Power: The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933, (Endeavour Press, Ltd., 
2016), Kindle Edition, Loc. 351. 
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III. Background History—1917-1919, War Guilt 
Before addressing the topic at hand, it is important to understand the sociopolitical 
influences onto the interwar period. After the end of the First World War in 1918, the losing 
armies faced problems on multiple fronts. In Germany, there were several key issues that would 
go on to create the perfect storm of events that led to Adolf Hitler becoming the Führer of 
Germany. The German economy prior to the start of the First World War was not stable enough 
to hold a sustained war, and the War had led to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), known 
during the period as shell shock, in many soldiers who survived the high causality rate. The War 
itself had dragged on longer than any belligerents had thought it would, leaving Germany itself 
with morale loss on the home front, where strikes and food riots had occurred from 1915 until 
the end of the War. The Strife of the period would translate into the distrust of the political 
leaders that would lead the Country near the end of the War. While these war years would 
influence the interwar years in economic, social, and political ways, for the purpose of this paper 
the focus needed to be on the outcome of the post-War peace talks that would wound German 
pride deeply in the coming decades. 9 
The peace talks at the end of the First World War had a grand impact; the days prior to 
the end of the First World War began the problematic sociopolitical elements. The Kaiser had 
abdicated and a new government was formed in November 1918, called the Weimar Republic. 
This parliamentary republic was different for the young country compared to the Kaiser Reich 
that they had for a short number of decades. The Weimar Republic had begun at a time of 
turmoil and humiliation for Germany, where the once greatest army in the world had been all but 
                                                           
9 Mary Fulbrook, A Concise History of Germany, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Kindle 
Edition.  
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defeated by foreign powers and faced with civil war appearing to loom on the horizon. Days 
after the Republic was formed, it had signed the armistice agreement on November 11, 1918, 
which had some of the early demands of Germany. These demands, including the loss of land, 
“hardly fell short of a total submission,” to the victorious Allies, but still Germans felt slighted 
who had believed an illusion that the war was still somehow in Germany’s favor.10 The peace 
talks themselves did not begin until January 1919, where Germany was represented by a 
professional diplomat of aristocratic origins, Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, who had antiquated 
ideals of national honor, and his entourage of advisors. Germany, even with a professional 
diplomat, was faced with being given little opportunity to engage in serious negotiations. Instead 
they were delivered in May 1919 a draft of the peace treaty and Brockdorff-Rantzau delivered a 
scathing speech on the treatment of the German delegation.11 
In regards to the article of the Treaty of Versailles, while the loss of land was great, with 
the treaty redefining the boundaries of Germany in Article 27, the most damning in the minds of 
many Germans were two articles detailing the burden of war guilt and the dismantling of the 
majority of the German military.12 The war guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles, Article 231, 
stated: 
 The Allied and Associated Governments affirms and Germany 
accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all 
the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated 
Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a 
consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of 
Germany and her allies.13 
 
                                                           
10 E. J. Feuchtwanger, “The Terms of the Versailles Treaty Led to the Rise of Nazism,” in The Rise of Nazi 
Germany, ed. Don Nardo, (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc, 1999), 48. 
11 Fulbrook. 
12 Fulbrook; Feuchtwanger. 
13 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), treaty document, Library of Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf, 95. 
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This short clause would cause damage to German pride and cause the Weimar government to be 
considered weak for agreeing to the idea of Germany being the main belligerent. While placing 
the war guilt on Germany was expressed, it was mainly used as the reason for arguing that 
Germany would have the main responsibility of reparations.  During the peace talks, this issue 
had loomed over the entire affair, and this outcome was the outcome of the belief that blame had 
worsened international relations during the interwar period. The international relations were 
strained to say the least by this, but nationally the already broken morale lead to distrust in the 
party and government that lead Germany into this disastrous path.14 
The second major part of the Treaty of Versailles was Articles 159-213, which described 
the forced demobilization and reduction of the German military. These articles described 
multiple aspects of reduction in the numbers of military personnel and forces, including reducing 
the German military forces to 200,000 by May 1920, when the treaty went into effect and 
limiting the number of armaments to what Germans considered an unreasonably sum. Germany 
had also been forced to decommission their airplanes, tanks, submarines, and other similarly 
offensive weaponry. This demilitarization left Germans feeling not only betrayed, but also 
lacking in military power, which they had been a leading member of the international militaristic 
influences. 15 
The few years prior to Adolf Hitler entering the German political scene were wrought 
with war, a sense of betrayal, and the desire for Germany to reemerge as an international power, 
stronger than it had been before the First World War. This desire would be the basis for many 
conservative nationalist groups, including what would become the Nazi Party. In the profound 
                                                           
14 Feuchtwanger. 
15 Treaty of Versailles; Feuchtwanger. 
8 
 
 
 
insecurities and broken morale of the German populous, it was the nature of the Weimar 
constitution that became the catalyst for the rise of the Nazis to national power. The constitution 
held in it Article 48 which described the powers of the German presidency and would become 
the most notorious section of the constitution. Article 48 gave the elected president to rule by 
emergency decree. Stating that, “[in] the event that public order and security are seriously 
disturbed or endangered, the Reich President may take the measures necessary for their 
restoration, intervening, if necessary with the aid of the armed forces,” and while the same article 
stated that it was possible for the Reichstag to annul these measures, the presidency had the 
means within the constitution to disband the Reichstag by decree with Article 25.16 The 
combination of the articles would be the basis for the later problems of the Weimar period, with 
the presidency of Paul von Hindenburg.17 
The interwar period discussed in this text was influenced by many factors; these main 
points had combined to create a figurative time bomb where a single group or individual could 
exploit the sociopolitical environment along with the economic and cultural pressures of the 
period. As discussed, it was with the close of the First World War that Germany was weakened 
by their belligerent war time enemies. They were burdened with an incomprehensible level of 
debt based on the war guilt clause and their military drained and disarmed, with outlying land 
taken from Germany, and—through all of these problems—the German political and social 
spheres began to distrust the Weimar government. In this basis Adolf Hitler would enter the 
political fray and, with time, gain a level of popularity that would end the Republic for good. 
                                                           
16 The Constitution of the German Empire of August 11, 1919 (Weimar Constitution), constitutional document, 
German History in Documents and Image, Volume 6: Weimar Germany, 1918/1919-1933,   
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/ghi_wr_weimarconstitution_Eng.pdf, 3; Evans, The Coming of the 
Third Reich. 
17 Fulbrook; Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), Kindle 
Edition.  
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IV. Conclusion—Last Words 
In researching this text, the purpose had always been to describe the nature of the 
interwar period in such a way that described how the social and political had interacted in 
Germany. Regarding this, the paper that follows was researched in a wide swatch of English 
language sources, both native and translated, that described the Hitler cult through their own 
lenses and historical periods. Major debates within the discipline had persisted until the writing 
of this paper that informed upon their texts and interpretations. As with many discussions, this 
paper arrives at its informed position through these multiple historians and its own writer’s 
position on their interpretations. Through the writings of an overarching debate between 
Functionalism and Intentionalism, the Sonderweg and Historikerstreit discussions of native and 
non-native German historians, this paper had developed an understanding of the interwar period 
that sought to create a rounded understanding of the sociopolitical means behind the propaganda 
and cult-like status of Hitler’s personality and its following.18
                                                           
18 Richard Bessel, “Functionalist vs. Intentionalists: The Debate Twenty Years on or Whatever Happen to 
Functionalism and Intentionalism?,” in German Studies Review 26, no. 1 (2003). 
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Chapter 1: The Beginnings of the National Socialist German Worker’s Party, 1919-1923 
   
After the end of the First World War, Germany was left with a heavy burden of war guilt 
and repayments with the Treaty of Versailles. With the abdication of the Kaiser, the Weimar 
Republic was created days before the war ended, and a myth that Germany had been betrayed, a 
conservative nationalist movement began to influence the sociopolitical landscape. This created 
an atmosphere of national trauma and political extremism that served to fuel the overall early 
interwar period, added to that was the inability of the Weimar Republic to win the support of the 
military and civil services that had not transitioned well from the authoritarian leadership of the 
Kaiser Reich to the democratic Weimar Republic. In this way the foundation of the Nazi Party 
was formed in relative obscurity in Germany. 1 
 
Fig 1:  Adolf Hitler dressed in his army uniform during WWI. 
                                                           
1 Hannah Vogt, “The Myth of Germany’s Betrayal Led to the Rise of Nazism,” in The Rise of Nazi Germany, ed. 
Don Nardo, (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc, 1999); Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2003). 
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I. Foundation of the Party: Search for a Leader and Voice 
While problems mounted in Germany, an upheaval of counter-revolutionary conservative 
movements began throughout the country. In Munich, the capital of the German state of Bavaria, 
the German Worker’s Party (DAP) had been formed in 1919 by Anton Drexler and Dietriech 
Eckart. At the same time, Hitler, a soldier in the weakened German military, was sent to inform 
the military on the movements of the fledgling party and their beer hall meetings.2 It was 
apparent in these early days that the party needed to have a good speaker, an orator who would 
work those in attendance into an agitated state. I t was at one of these meetings that Hitler was 
noticed by Drexler and Eckart with an impassioned speech that roused the gathered crowd. Even 
in 1919, Hitler had a noteworthy, “rare ability to captivate a crowd with his voice,” and an 
uncanny intuition on what people wanted to hear.3 By gaining the attention of the duo, Hitler was 
able to join the party, originally at the behest of his commanding officer, and became one of the 
star speakers of the party.4At this early point, it was important to note part of the reason for 
Hitler to be accepted into the party in such a short time.  
Firstly, there was an understanding of the völkisch belief in heroic leadership, not only as 
an aspect of the nationalist right, but also as a function of the nineteenth century ideas of, 
“political notions and the mythical visions of Germanic leadership associated with the romantic-
conservative strain of early völkisch-nationalist thought.”5 This conservative notion was an 
important concept in how accepting the party was towards a rebel rousing voice that Hitler had 
                                                           
2 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich.  
3 Benjamin Carter Hett, The Death of Democracy: Hitler’s Rise to Power and the Downfall of the Weimar Republic, 
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2018), Kindle Edition. Loc. 357. 
4 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich.  
5 Ian Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich, (Oxford: University Press, 2001), 13-14. 
12 
 
 
 
introduced. Drexler was impressed by Hitler’s passion in speaking against a previous speaker 
who argued for the separation of Bavaria from the Reich. The pan-German approach is 
something that would play a role in Hitler’s beliefs for the party up to the start of the war, but at 
this early stage had no fully developed ideology at this time.6 With that said, Hitler had 
addressed at this moment something that would develop as part of the party program, and with it 
he had impressed the DAP. 
Secondly, Eckart, a writer by trade, had described the need for a messiah of sorts; a 
nobody that would be able to rise up and challenge the political realities of the interwar period.7 
Eckart was also part of a secretive occult society, the Thule Society, during this time that 
influenced the early party. This occult society held multiple beliefs that would later appear 
within the context of the Nazi Regime; of note were the ideas of an Aryan race and the use of 
swastika as a symbol of racial priorities. Eckart’s belief used this and the same völkisch belief in 
a ‘heroic’ leader. This Führer to the people, described by the society, would become essential to 
the party and the cult of personality. These beliefs would take the Führer idea in the following 
years, even prior to Hitler’s later perception on his central role, and shape it into a nationalist 
authoritarian model. 8 
This early formation of the party showed little of what would later become the Nazi 
expansion plan. The party in 1919, had a vague program, few members, rudimentary 
organizational framework, and a timid leadership. Once Hitler had joined, he became a star 
speaker of the party and used his oratory skills in rousing the crowds. Early party member, 
                                                           
6 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth; Ian Kershaw, “Hitler and the Uniqueness of 
Nazism,” in Journal of Contemporary History39, no. 2 (April, 2004): 239-254.  
7 Hitler’s Circle of Evil, Season 1: episode 1-4, dir. By Mathew Hinchcliffe et al., (Netflix, 2017). 
8 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich; Bernard Mees, “Hitler and Germanentum,” in Journal of Contemporary 
History 39, no. 2 (April, 2004); Pridham. Kershaw, the ‘Hitler Myth.’ 
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Rudolf Heβ was moved by Hitler in such a way that he had become a devoted member under his 
leadership and part of the cult of personality. Others would flock to the propagandist and orator 
in the following years, but at this point Hitler and the party were seen as little more than a 
function of the overall völkisch movement. 9 
While Adolf Hitler had the voice and force of presence for the party, his behavior was not 
accustomed the upper echelon of German society that Eckart attempted to introduce him into; to 
combat this, Eckart worked on refining Hitler in dress and behavior, but most importantly as a 
writer, he was able to turn Hitler’s impassioned, but occasionally incoherent rambles into 
impressive speeches. While not changing the context and nature of the orators words, Eckart in 
this early period was able to refine his speech, but Hitler, the star party speaker, was still viewed 
as a vulgar demagogue who roused the Munich opposition, but little else.10  
These first years prior to Hitler’s assumption of leadership were important the foundation 
of the party, but also to the personality cult. Hitler at this time was the party propagandist, 
tactician, and organizer. Hitler attempted in December 1919 to completely reorganization the 
party to his authoritarian inclinations, seeing the party’s structure as inadequate, but he was 
unable to completely remove the democratic atmosphere that prevailed in the party. Also in 
December 1919, Hitler and Drexler worked on creating a party program that had influenced the 
NSDAP until it ultimate end.11  
 
                                                           
9 Hitler’s Circle of Evil; Dietrich O. Orlow, “The Organizational History and Structure of the NSDAP, 1919-1923,” 
in The Journal of Modern History 37, no. 2 (June, 1965).  
10 Hitler’s Circle of Evil; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth.’ 
11 Orlow, “The Organizational History and Structure of the NSDAP, 1919-1923.” 
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II. Twenty-Five Point Plan 
Adolf Hitler and Anton Drexler worked together to create the Party platform for the DAP 
to have an official program in December 1919 for the party’s first staged mass meeting which 
had a crowded of two thousand people in attendance in February 1920. The platform they created 
was twenty-five points of short statements that had later been expanded upon by Mein Kampf, 
but were still vague to their nature and meaning. Among the points were a handful that would be 
an asset to the Hitler cult as Germans began to flock to the party in the 1920s. A point was made 
for the state responsibility towards civilian life, but the strict anti-Semitic and xenophobic 
remarks would lend to the education of Germans in the Nazi propaganda. Education, according 
to Hitler and Drexler, was to be reconstructed with an emphasis placed on teaching the concept 
of State from an early age. Education, as a function of indoctrination, had functioned importantly 
for the party, in a similar manner as it had in the Stalinist period of Soviet Russia. 12 
More important to the influence on the cult of personality was the argument of press 
censorship, in relation to what the party considered non-German newspaper and forbidding 
publications that were, “counter to the general good,” of the belief in an Aryan nation and the 
Hitler cult. This idea was part of the nature of propaganda that Hitler had professed in his 
ideology, a tool that would influence the lay masses. Functional to the accepting of the party, 
was the idea of connecting the party to a religious basis in the interwar period. For this Drexler 
and Hitler argued for, “the standpoint of a positive Christianity,” while avoiding connection to 
any one denomination.13 The final point, the need for a strong central power, was the culmination 
of the points and party ideology. Centralized authority, especially under a single charismatic 
                                                           
12 Hett,; Robert Ley ed., “The 25 Points 1920: An Early Nazi Propaganda,” trans. Paul Halsall, Avalon Project-
Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), 
http:/avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/1708-ps.asp.  
13 Ley, “The 25 Points 1920.” 
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leader, as had been discussed previously was central to cult of personality’s ability to reach 
further than a small circle of followers.14  
The twenty-five points were, “a politically expedient mixture of extreme nationalism, 
violent anti-Semitism,” and a promise to end the Pan-German enslavement to  the foreign 
powers.15 The cult of personality was greatly influenced by these early points as they were 
carried through the party’s actions until the end of the Nazi regime. The influence on the German 
sociopolitical sphere would, as noted, continue to grow with the party. Central to this, was 
especially the relationship of the party to the Führer concept overall. 
 
III. Hitler Leads the Party 
 In 1920, Hitler successfully argued for the DAP to change their name to the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (trans: National Socialist German Worker’s 
Party), this name change effectively addressed the party’s conservative affiliation. Adolf Hitler 
had become established in the Bavarian extremist Right as its most prominent party leader and 
had proved himself indispensable to the party due to not only his rebel rousing, but also his 
forceful presence and firebrand manner. His actions for the party were motivated by the desire 
for the NSDAP to be seen in a different character than the rest of the nationalist parties. To this 
aim, Hitler argued that the NSDAP would be, “a party of action and of the people.”16  The 
growing ego had the effect to sway a portion of the NSDAP to Hitler’s side in party arguments. 
This was the point where Hitler began to push Drexler and Eckart to the side. 
                                                           
14 Ley, “The 25 Points 1920”; Ian Kershaw, “‘Working Towards the Führer.’ Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler 
Dictatorship,” in Contemporary European History 2, no. 2 (July, 1993). 
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In 1921, Hitler made a power move to become the sole leader of the party, upon learning 
that Drexler was attempting to merge the NSDAP with another Bavarian party. This played 
allowed Hitler to act on his desire to lead the party, in which after giving an impassioned rant, he 
promptly quit the party. This was a measured ploy on Hitler’s part, knowing that without his 
personality and follower s, the party would crumble; Drexler for his part back-pedaled and 
conceited to Hitler’s demands. The party merger was abandoned and Hitler was placed in sole 
leadership of the NSDAP, confirmed in July of that year. With the party in his control, Hitler 
received exactly what he had wanted since choosing this political path. As a demagogy, Hitler 
had achieved a level of success in becoming the authoritarian leader of the party with sole 
dictatorial powers. This would allow his propaganda stance to be held by the party and it 
growing branches, but also gave way to the growth of the Hitler cult. 17 
By this point, Hitler had gained Rudolf Heβ, Ernst Röhm, and returning war hero 
Hermann Göring, as part of his inner circle. These men functioned well under the personality 
cult, while at this time only Heβ was truly captivated by Hitler’s personality, Röhm and Göring 
would function within the party understanding the charisma that Hitler exuded as their best 
chance to gain prominence. While this was not functionally a cult this early on, the functions of 
the party’s adherence to the control of Hitler and his whims had begun at this point. 18 
 
IV. Orator and propaganda 
 For historians, 1921 was the year Hitler’s career really started as the NSDAP had not 
only a party program, but Hitler himself had gained sole authority. Gone were the days of army 
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service, replaced by his unlimited power in the small, but growing Bavarian party. After his 
conflict with Drexler over his failed party merger plot, “Hitler was able to transform the NSDAP 
into a fascist organization,” including an organizational structure that was focused on continuous 
propaganda.19 The party was to work on gaining new members and sympathizers, avoid debates 
with other parties, and overall had a military structure to organize the party. At this time he was 
occasionally called ‘Führer,’ though it was functionally in the same vein as Drexler’s 
‘Chairman’ title, but was solely used within the party in reference to Hitler. Describing his 
speeches, historians had argued that this in this early period Hitler’s propaganda was similar to 
Mussolini’s due to his admiration of the Italian fascist movement as a structure. Adjusting his 
oratory focus on to some aspects of the Italian fascist propaganda style, Hitler was still focused 
on the belief in the heroic leadership that would be the sole leader of the German nation, leading 
a pan-Germanic nation to greatness.20  
The focus on propaganda was natural to Hitler’s belief in the party structure, and his 
tireless efforts had impacted the overall counter revolutionary movement leading to him standing 
out amongst the movement. As a competent propagandist, Hitler used his party control to 
efficiently create the party in his mental image; down to the party songs, uniform, and flags, 
Hitler sought to control every aspect of the party’s image.21 The work done in the early party was 
important to the propaganda in the coming years, but for now it had the effect of giving the 
growing party a meaning that surpassed the völkisch views of other nationalist groups. With his 
actions within the party, Hitler had become much more than the star orator and propagandist. As 
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the leader of the party, Hitler had gained a position that would propel him and his followers into 
the highest levels of government. 
 
V. Conclusion: The Early Days 
Looking back on the nature of the early party, Adolf Hitler had a growing ego and self-
promoting attitude. Hett argued that he always spoke of those early party days, “with himself as 
the hero, the political genius and natural leader who went his own way.”22 From 1919 until 1923, 
the early party was an important part of the foundation of the Hitler cult. These years would be 
credited with the creation of the Sturmabteilung (translated: Storm Division, SA), the 
paramilitary group that functioned as the strong arm of the party and was led at this time by 
Herman Göring.23 The early interwar period had functioned as the setup for the party’s later rise, 
where the early rules and functions of the Hitler cult had been placed within the sociopolitical 
constructs. In these pre-Putsch days, Hitler functioned as the orator and propaganda head of the 
party, even during his time as its main head. The Führer myth had been created with the ousting 
of the former party leadership of Drexler and Eckart. The following years would cement it in 
history.
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Chapter 2: The Beer Hall Putsch and Landsberg Prison 
 
As 1923 arrived, the state of Germany had been improving from the end of the first war, 
while inflation still had control of the country, as the years prior had the effect that the cost for a 
United States dollar had risen to 493 German papiermarks, in 1921-1922 it had the effect of 
some economic growth in the industrial sector, low unemployment and taxation rates. These 
were a boon to the Weimar Government, and they were able at the time to pull the German 
economy into a peacetime basis that was stable for the time—as not only Germany had suffered 
a postwar inflation. During this period, the rebel rousing of the counter revolutionaries, like the 
NSDAP, were losing some ground but they would continue their agitation against the Weimar 
government. In April of 1922 there was an international attempt in Genoa to structure the war 
reparation payments easier, though longer, for Germany, but in the six weeks the international 
forum was unable to settle a new requirement. While this would seemingly end the chance of a 
conservative nationalistic organization in gaining membership, the stability of the period was 
always threatened by the fluctuating reichmark and the political turmoil within the Reichstag. 1 
By the middle of 1922, this stability changed, and by July 1923 the exchange rate had 
begun to spiral out of control and the German Ruhr, its main industrial area, had been occupied 
by French and Belgians troops for several months. The Weimar government announced a 
noncompliance policy with these developments that had the German currency falling further. 
While a newly introduced currency halted the inflation before it broke the German economy, and 
the troops were removed with the end of the noncompliance, it still caused a rise in the 
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unemployment rate that had the business and social spheres distrusting the political majority. The 
Weimar constitution that had carried the government since the end of the war had become 
problematic. Its main problem was the independently elected presidency with wide-ranging 
powers under Article 48, that gave the president the ability disband the parliament as seen 
necessary. While it was used less under President Friedrich Ebert, the abuse of Article 48 would 
become more prominent after his death in 1925.2  
The period of years covered in this chapter, 1923-1925, for the NSDAP these were trying 
times, but also filled with important details that would become important in the culture of the 
Third Reich and the Führer cult. While Hitler had achieved the position of party leader, the party 
had yet to gain the level of power that even closely resembled his desires. The position of the 
Hitler cult in these years was one of flux, where the greatest importance to note is that charisma, 
as it functioned with the cult-like following of Hitler during the interwar period, “exists only in 
an interaction between one individual and an audience.”3  This idea was important to the context 
of the movement’s attempt at seizing power during the Beer Haul Putsch especially. 
 
I. Lead Up 
In January 1923, the NSDAP held its annual party meeting in Munich. This gathering 
was vastly different than party gatherings in the years prior where Hitler had continued to 
attempt to consolidate the party under his complete control. At this time he had increased in self 
confidence and, encouraged by the actions of Mussolini in Italy, began plotting, “for an 
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opportunity to stage an action against the Republic.”4 With the uptick of party propaganda under 
Hitler’s leadership, the party was also taking part in the sociopolitical upheaval that brought 
violence to the streets as Germans began to distrust the leading politics. In this perspective, 
Hitler had gained a louder voice in the Bavarian nationalist movement, and the position as the 
honored leader of the NSDAP.5  
While Hitler sought a way to take control of the Bavarian government, his pre-Putsch 
goal, it was the social atmosphere that had been the largest influence on his reasoning for 
beginning to plan the Putsch. With the occupation of the Ruhr close in mind, Germans had a firm 
reminder of the humiliation of the peace terms and Hitler was able to focus on the public’s mood. 
It was this ability that allowed the cult to flourish in this period, with the idea that those in 
control of the government had continued to betray them and that the NSDAP, and especially he, 
had the intense conviction to address and change their problems. For Hitler the atmosphere of 
this period had become a seemingly perfect storm for his demanding demeanor. The connection 
between the Führer cult and the sociopolitical effects of the hyperinflation and military 
occupation were notable, though for the thousands the party had flocking to its leader, there was 
few outside of working class that had fallen under Hitler’s charismatic presence, but those that 
had were spurred by the economic hardships placed on the middle class during the 
hyperinflation. 6 
Outside of this, there were others at work on the Putsch plot. Herman Göring was leading 
the SA, Ernst Röhm resigned from the army and with Göring began to encourage Hitler to act on 
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the plan. The greatest inspiration and encouragement came from Hitler’s adoration of the fascist 
movements of Mussolini and Göring’s goading. Hitler chose to act as three Bavarian state 
leaders met at the Bürgerbräukeller, one of the main beer halls in Munich; and, as Hitler was not 
well known, though the Führer cult and party membership had grown in numbers, they chose to 
recruit a famous war hero, Erich Ludendorff, to be a temporary face for the part.  Ludendorff was 
an interesting choice for Hitler as a recognizable face for the party. While well respected as a war 
hero he was himself a similar throwback to the Kaiser Reich as a military leader, and towards the 
end of the war was part of the military leaders the last two years of the war. The prestige he had 
in the war placed him as an important figure within the conservative right and in 1920, arrived in 
Munich meeting the ultranationalist movement that had begun to circle around Hitler.7 
 
Fig 2: Erich Ludendorff 
It is noteworthy to discuss what the triumvirate, led by Gustav Ritter von Kahr, aimed to 
do in comparison to Hitler’s plan on the eve of the Putsch. While Hitler and, by extension, his 
Nazis were looking to overthrow the Weimar Republic starting in Bavaria, this was not the 
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central belief of the three men that headed the state. The difference between the two was that the 
triumvirate was separatists at heart, believing that Bavaria needed its autonomy. This divergence 
in thought was central to the plot behind the nature of the attempted Putsch. This move was, 
therefore, less about Hitler choosing to act on his overwhelming desire to control the country. 
Instead, he believed that the Bavarian triumvirate might act before him with a similar take over 
or break from the German government. 8 
 
II. The Putsch  
On November 8, 1923, the NSDAP enacted their Putsch. The two pronged action plan 
had split Röhm and a contingency of the SA was with him—including a newly recruited 
Heinrich Himmler—to wait for a call to take key buildings; while Göring and Heβ had 
accompanied Hitler to the main beer hall to begin their Putsch, where Ludendorff their 
temporary figure head was missing in action as the Putsch began. With weapons procured by 
Röhm, the Nazis stormed the Bürgerbräukeller as the leaders held their meeting and took the 
hall’s inhabitant hostage. Göring took charge of the hall, while Hitler took the three leaders into a 
side room. In this side room, Hitler announced to the three men that a new Bavarian government 
was to be formed under his leadership and their party would first take the state, and then march 
to Berlin. Röhm would work as the Bavarian Prime Minister, Ludendorff would take the 
military, and Hitler himself would temporarily take on the leadership of the new Reich. In doing 
so, Hitler had threatened death to the leaders if they chose not to support the new Nazi headed 
regime. During this, with Ludendorff gone, Göring had worked to calm the crowd, drinking and 
                                                           
8 Otis C. Mitchell, “The Nazis’ failed ‘Beer Hall Putsch,’” in The Rise of Nazi Germany, ed. Don Nardo, (San 
Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc, 1999).  
24 
 
 
 
joking with the captives of the beer hall, but the crowd was becoming restless as the minutes 
passed. After Ludendorff arrived, he himself had become disgruntled at Hitler as he had placed 
himself at the head of this hastily pressed and ill formed idea of a government. After the 
triumvirate had agreed to work with the NSDAP in Bavaria, Hitler was called away leaving 
Ludendorff and Göring in charge of their respective locations. Röhm, separate from this location, 
had taken the army headquarters before marching onward. While this appeared to give credit to 
the still relatively small fascist group and had been a successful outbreak of a counter-revolution, 
this was not the case. No supporters, no matter the number, could assist Hitler, and his cult of 
personality, in obtaining the firm placement they needed at this time. 9   
Instead, this pressured move had begun to implode as Hitler left the hall; Röhm’s group 
had been rounded by the army and pushed back. Ludendorff allowed Kahr and the others to 
leave the hall with little more than a promise; Göring, Heβ, and the SA members there had been 
unable to keep the beer hall under Nazi control. With the German president, Friedrich Ebert, 
calling on his presidential powers under Article 48 to use his emergency powers, the German 
army was used as part of a police move to take control of the situation the next morning. Munich 
was surrounded by soldiers loyal to the Weimar constitution. This was not the end of the Putsch, 
as Hitler’s followers had routed to make a last march through the city center towards the 
Ministry of War with about armed supporters. Met by the police not far from their starting point, 
the party linked arms, and shots were fired. At this time, Ludendorff, Röhm, and Heβ were 
arrested, Göring was injured but escaped to heal in Sweden and gain an addiction to morphine, 
and Himmler returned to his parents’ home. Hitler, with a bullet straying towards a supporter at 
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his side rather than into his own chest, escaped mostly unharmed to be arrested days later on 
November 11, in the Bavarian country side. It is interesting to contemplate the sociopolitical 
motives behind the Putsch, with the economic stressors in place and a few thousand NSDAP 
members recruited, the social sphere had the chance to broaden the cult of personality with the 
capture of the Bavarian government in a similar fashion to Italy’s fascist take over. Instead, there 
was a chance that the entire movement could have been ended with the death of the face and 
voice of the movement. 10 
The failure of the Putsch had a variety of effects on the party and Hitler. In the days 
following, it could be described as a dismal failure, “in the immediate sense that its aim of 
establishing a counter-revolutionary ‘national government’ in Berlin,” had not worked in the 
slightest.11 The party was left in shambles, and while it had sparked gossip and disappointment 
for many Munich citizens, it had the chance to destroy the party for good. Hitler had become a 
broken man in the days and months following the failed coup, but he would not remain broken 
for long. Instead, Hitler would turn the subsequent trial into a stage for his brand of rebel 
rousing. With the hindsight into the day, it is simple to underestimate the blow this had on the 
sociopolitical influences that the Putsch had on the overall Nazi movement. In the wake of the 
arrest of key members of the party, the impact that had been built for months had the chance to 
fade in obscurity, to be a mere footnote on the interwar period as a whole. 12 
That was not the case for the Nazis, nor for the Hitler cult; rather, it as in failure that 
Hitler would be pushed into viewing himself as the heroic leader Germany needed. His concept 
of leadership had begun to move from his role as the drummer of party propaganda to the 
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Führer. Though the title had been used for him prior to the Putsch, the link between it and the 
heroic leader myth was not cemented until later in the interwar period. Instead, the period 
between the Putsch and trial had become a transitional period for Hitler, one that would go on to 
create the perfect cult figure for a wounded and bitter population. 13 
 
III. Trial and Prison 
The trial for the Putsch conspirators began on February 26, 1924, with Hitler in the 
spotlight. As it opened, the stage was set for a dauntless tirade of his own brand of propaganda. 
He glorified his role in the Putsch, and the presiding judge gave him the floor to propagate as he 
pleased. This gave Hitler the ability to argue his personal attack on the Weimar government, 
while also allowing him to take the blame for the Putsch. Lasting for nearly a month, it had also 
posed a problem for the Bavarian authorities, if Hitler had not taken the blame or if the trial had 
happened in Berlin there was a chance that his knowledge of certain backers of the movement 
within the Bavarian political circle.14 
During the month long trial, Hitler had used his oratory skills to glorify his role in the 
Putsch, staging his own propaganda while refusing to answer questions posed by the prosecution. 
In this position, Hitler was able to keep his credibility as a fanatical ultra-conservative 
provocateur and orator, and the Bavarian triumvirate and army would keep their anti-Weimar 
actions a secret from the Berlin government. During these periods, with one lengthy session at 
four hours, Hitler went on the attack against the government, both the Bavarian state and Weimar 
Republic. The timing of the trial during a campaign season lent to the publicity of the trail and 
                                                           
13Ian Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth:’ Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford: University Press, 2001). 
14 Pridham; Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000); The Dark 
Charisma of Adolf Hitler; Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich. 
27 
 
 
 
had the chance of reviving interests in the NSDAP and Hitler as a speaker. The publicity of the 
trial was dangerous for the Bavarian government in the role its leaders, like Kahr, had in the 
Putsch, which meant that by whatever means they would avoid bringing the attention of the 
Weimar Republic onto the trial. A sympathetic judge allowed Hitler to have a more pronounced 
presence in the court room, which at the time won him and his movement admirers as 
newspapers covered his court room speeches. All of these things lead to Hitler turning the trial 
into a propaganda victory from the start, with the assertion that he and his party were resolved to 
destroy Marxism and argued that the sanctions placed by the Treaty of Versailles at the end of 
the war were part of their reasoning for the Putsch. In gaining some admirers, the cult of 
personality would grow during the trial, with some of the sociopolitical exchanges between the 
court room and the state government having the effect of centering the attention on Hitler and his 
courtroom propaganda. 15 
When the trial came to a close, the accused were given their verdict at the end of the trial, 
Ludendorff was acquitted, while Hitler and his other co-defendants were sentenced to five years. 
The court chose not to deport Hitler, which in itself was odd, with the argument against his 
deportation that, Hitler had considered himself German-Austrian and, “the meaning and intention 
of the terms of section 9, para II of the Law of the Protection of the Republic cannot apply to a 
man who thinks and feels as German as Hitler,” had described himself.16 His voluntary service in 
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the German army during the First World War was also a contributing factor in this court 
decision, and so Hitler was given a relatively light sentence in a rather plush prison cell.17 
Hitler’s time in Landsberg prison could have ended the cult of personality if it had been 
different circumstances. While the party and Hitler had been placed on the back burner by the 
political sphere, Hitler spent the time perfecting his political ideology at the behest of Heβ, his 
secretary and primary support within his inner circle.  Heβ himself had been captivated by the 
cultish influence of Hitler during the early foundations of the party, through the years his 
dedication to Hitler became stronger. This time became a rest period for Hitler, rather than a grey 
and drab prison cell, Hitler’s cell was akin more so to an apartment, with visitors, gifts, and other 
luxuries was unusual for a prison inmate; even the jailers treated the Nazi leader with respect. 
This reaction to Hitler’s entry into Landsberg had an interesting effect on the cult of personality. 
While other cult figures may have fallen from an important status, this did little to tarnish the 
Hitler cult, which was due in part to how he had handled the trial and the sociopolitical 
environment of the interwar period. 18 
 
Fig 3: Adolf Hitler and companions, including Rudolf Heβ at Landsberg Prison. 
                                                           
17 Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936; Pridham; Benjamin Carter Hett, The Death of Democracy: Hitler’s Rise to Power 
and the Downfall of the Weimar Republic (Henry Holt and Co., 2018), Kindle Edition. 
18 Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth;’ Pridham; Hitler’s Circle of Evil. 
29 
 
 
 
Prison had also given Hitler the time to focus on the nature of his leadership, and in doing 
so it gave him the chance to think over the Putsch and how the party might need to be changed in 
order to achieve his desire for total control of Germany. This was his second time in Landsberg, 
but it held a different significance than his previous stay; instead of it being a drab number of 
years that had him hidden and forgotten, Hitler had been given the chance to remain somewhat 
relevant, albeit quiet figure. While his time in prison took him away from the political scene, and 
in turn had the party’s influence dwindle slightly during the absence of their leader, it was his 
writing of Mein Kampf that would go on to make the largest contribution to the definition of his 
political stance.  In dictating this, Hitler had created a blueprint for his later actions and detailed 
his demands in the lengthy text. 19 
 
IV. Mein Kampf  
During his time in Landsberg prison Hitler would write his political ideology at the 
prodding of secretary and cult of personality follower, Rudolf Heβ. Mein Kampf was the 
outcome of this period, a text that had brought together his personal views, beliefs, and certain 
lies in connection with his life; it was an autobiography that was meant to be his political 
manifesto at the time. Pressed by Heβ to write his political ideals, it is important to understand 
before pressing forward that Hitler was not a skilled writer. As an orator, he had the charisma to 
move his supporters in words, but in writing the connection that he had in his charismatic 
authority was not as apparent. Nevertheless, Mein Kampf would become known as the Nazi 
Bible for it had in its pages the exact nature of his ideology. Prior to the Nazi takeover in 1933, 
few would finish the pages, and many who read the text at all were mainly non-Nazis in 
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Germany. Understanding this, it was easy to understand how Mein Kampf would become 
important to the narrative of the Nazi period, but it also was noteworthy for the efforts of years 
between his time in Landsberg prison and being appointed German chancellor. The role it played 
in the cult of personality is of the most important for several reason: his views on what made a 
German, propaganda, and his ideals on indoctrination with education. 20 
 The concept of Germaneness was important to the overall propaganda and ideology 
within Mein Kampf, as Hitler had shown, “some sensibility of the old Germanic past,” but where 
some would focus on multiple aspects of a racial German past, he had focused mostly Aryans.21 
It was not odd in the ultranationalist counter movement to argue for a racist concept of German 
exceptionalism with the term Germanentum becoming a buzz word in the 1920s, Hitler himself 
preferred to use other means to describe his brand of German heritage. His focus on the Aryan 
aspect of this belief was just as important to the founding of the DAP as it was to his racial 
propaganda, with the Thule Society, and Dietriech Eckart, believing in a mythical bases for their 
foundation of what they assumed a superior race. This had, in all likelihood, influenced Hitler 
after he joined the party. The stress on the Aryan origins of Germany by Hitler seemed to be a 
rejection of part of the racist conservative movement; what was truly interesting was Hitler’s 
rejection of the mystification of the movement, instead he could be perceived as, “a sober man of 
facts,” though the racial sciences used, social Darwinism, would be reject as fact as the twenty-
first century continued.22 The racial beliefs of Germaneness and its foundation in an Aryan race 
would become important to the Hitler cult, especially in the perception of what made the best 
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Germans. While Hitler himself did not look like the traditional Aryan—blond hair, blue eyed—
in other ways Hitler became the embodiment of the leader who would bring the supposed race 
into their promised positioned. 23 
In regards to the focus of this paper, the most important aspect of Mein Kampf was 
Hitler’s discussion on the meaning and use of propaganda.  Throughout the course of his political 
career, propaganda was a central feature in his sociopolitical focus. During the early 1920s, 
Hitler was the driving force of the early Nazi propaganda and had devoted his entire time, as an 
unemployed veteran, to this cause. It was not a stretch then that Hitler would write about the 
importance of propaganda within Mein Kampf, and would focus an entire chapter of the text to 
the subject. In modeling his reasoning for the successful use of propaganda Hitler had focused on 
two things. The first was the use of propaganda during the First World War by both Germany 
and the belligerent Allied forces stating that, “[it] was during the War, however, that we had the 
best chance of estimating the tremendous result which could be obtained by a propagandist 
system properly carried out.”24 This lesson had gone on to inspire the context of propaganda not 
only of Mein Kampf, but also within the cult of personality and its role in bringing Hitler to 
greater prominence. The impact of propaganda during the First World War for Hitler was reliant 
on the audience it was mean to, and did, reach—in Mein Kampf, this was described as the need 
for propaganda to be addressed to the mass populous. The second modeled reason for the use of 
propaganda was connected the audience it was meant to affect. Propaganda was meant to move 
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the masses, bring attention to certain issues, while avoiding what the propagandist wished to 
ignore in favor of their own narrative. It was used, according to Hitler, at a purely intellectual 
level with the, “lowest mental common denominator among the public it is desired to reach,” and 
was meant to awaken their imagination and feelings.25 This focus was certainly important to 
sustaining the Hitler cult until the end of the Second World War, but during his time in 
Landsberg prison the reach of the propaganda was lacking the impact it would achieve during the 
later interwar period. At this time, the concept of propaganda was central not only to political 
power, it was also important to Führer myth as ideology, and while it was not central within 
Mein Kampf, it was still an important influence in the outreach of the text, though small as it 
was. It was in understanding this that the last two major aspects of Mein Kampf would deliver the 
desires of the megalomaniac that Hitler was to become. 26 
The role of women and youths in Germany was important within Hitler’s discussion. The 
arguments that Hitler would present in Mein Kampf centered on traditional gender roles and the 
state control of education, two of the main concepts stated in the 25 points of the Nazi program 
in 1920. To touch upon these again, education was discussed in point 20, stating: 
The state is to be responsible for a fundamental reconstruction of 
our whole national education program… The plans of instruction 
of all educational institutions are to conform with the experiences 
of practical life. The comprehension of the concept of the State 
must be striven for by the school…as early as the beginning of 
understanding.27 
 
As part of this, it is important to note the level of indoctrination that would be necessary in this 
education. In a continuation of this, Mein Kampf described the need for educating the youth with 
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the propaganda of the movement. The sense of Germaneness and Aryan superiority were 
important discussions within Mein Kampf, but in regards to the education of the youth, he 
described the lack of central aspects in what he believed his own education had failed—the 
inculcated, or rather indoctrination, of a common citizenship. Arguing the necessity of this, he 
also expressed the need for the state to have control over the education of the youth to ensure an 
uninformative application of their education. The connection between school education and the 
Hitler cult would be cemented later in the decade with the creation of the Hitler Youth in 1926, 
but at this early stage it was simply an importance of spreading the racist ideology within the 
sociopolitical constraints of the Nazi leader. 28  
Women held a unique, though vastly traditional, role in Mein Kampf. Partially an aspect 
of the male dominated society and a fear of women taking work form men, and partially an 
aspect of the view of women as a mother, Hitler’s text described women in their function as the 
völkisch maternal figure. Women were the carriers of the next generation, and in a traditional 
sense, they were meant to teach their children in the ultra-conservative belief that Hitler 
preached. In Mein Kampf Hitler had treated women as lesser than their male counter parts, 
needing to be protected and kept at home, though he did not argue outright that working women 
would be removed from work. Instead Hitler would argue that women were passive in many 
instances and argue for hygienic conditions of the working-class and protect women in the work 
force. It connected with the idea of propagating to youths by its arguments against child-labor 
and the encouragement of traditional gender roles and physical exercise in connection to their 
intellectual training at schools. Later in the text there will be a discussion on the response of 
women to the Hitler cult, but for now it is important to note that when connecting women to the 
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cult of personality, Mein Kampf was not the gold standard for the response to women acting in 
their interests in a practical sense. The ideology of the text was less important to the women 
connected to the Nazi Party, but in tying the concept of motherhood to the purity of an Aryan 
heritage, it is important in creating the propaganda behind to sociopolitical focus of the Hitler 
cult. 29 
For historians, Mein Kampf had been the blueprint, along with the 25 Point Plan, for the 
leadership of Germany under Hitler and his party. Richard Evans described it as a heavily edited, 
tedious poorly sold text during the Weimar period. While well known during the present period, 
the text held within its pages a level of hate that would transcend the cult of personality in 
ideology. There was little to no doubt of what Hitler wanted after its publication, but the 
implementation of the plan was severely lacking. In stating his ideology, Hitler was showing his 
hand with limited ideas as to it would play out. The nature of his cult of personality would regard 
him as a masterful orator, but it was highly unlikely that many had read the entirety of the text. 30 
 
V. Conclusion: Odd Sort of Victory 
With the creation of Mein Kampf, “[it] can be argued that by 1924, the central core of 
Hitler’s worldview…was a conception firmly planted in his thinking.”31 Though within this, the 
concept of his position as the necessary heroic leader was not settled as the year came to a close. 
His time in prison had changed his perspective on the how the NSDAP would gain political 
power. While a coup had been successful for Mussolini in Italy, it would not work in Germany; 
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instead Hitler decided that it would be important for the party to act within the democratic 
government. Hitler would adjust his ideas of his role within the party, and within Germany as a 
whole. Where he had argued that a mythical leader would appear to save Germany, after 
Landsberg he would begin to argue that it was in fact himself, Adolf Hitler, which was the 
destined leader.32 
Though this was a political stab at the party, the Putsch had become an odd sort of victory 
for the NSDAP, and especially Hitler in several ways, including bringing a certain level of 
publicity to him prior to his imprisonment. Prison was a sort of rest cure for Hitler, with his plush 
cell and some level of visitors. One of the greatest outcomes from the failure of the Putsch was 
the idea that a takeover of Germany would not happen as it had in Italy. Instead it would take 
preying on the weaknesses of the democratic Weimar system and using his charismatic authority 
to influence the sociopolitical influences upon the elections. In the process of using the weakness 
of the democratic system, Hitler would need to build up his party from a splintered status in the 
coming years to achieve his desires. His cult of personality would have an added mystique within 
the period as Hitler had, for a period of years, been banned from speaking at public meetings. 
This period would become a strong influence on the NSDAP and on the cult of personality that 
surrounded Hitler during the period, but the party was in need of being rebuilt in the Putsch 
aftermath. 33 
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Chapter 3: Second Chance Führer 
 
 Adolf Hitler was released in December 1924, after a short stay in prison, serving 
only months of his five year sentence. His release happened weeks after the Reichstag election, 
with few believing that he would be able to recover from the blow to his party and with the 
Bavarian government failing to deport him to Austria. At this point, the NSDAP was banned 
from activity and much of the party members were splintered throughout the ultra-conservative 
völkisch parties. The cult of personality suffered along with the Nazi Party itself, with those loyal 
to Hitler’s cult of personality being scattered with the rest of the NSDAP. While Heβ served his 
jail time with Hitler, Röhm had spent the time assembling a stronger block of soldiers during this 
period—called a sports club while the NSDAP was banned, these men would become the 
blighted element of the party with the tendency towards violence in the streets.1  
The party could have ended in 1924, but as Kershaw described, “Hitler could begin his 
emergence from the broken and fragmented völkisch movement,” to lead his party once again.2 
This was his genesis in a way, where Hitler would begin to find in his own image the mythical 
Führer that he had described previously. His rivals within the völkisch movement failed in their 
attempts to take the Reichstag and without his charismatic leadership, the movement was 
doomed to splintering and failure on the local and national fronts. During the trial and his time in 
Landsberg, Hitler had become admired by the völkisch movement for his cult of personality that 
flooded into the period. But while he was admired, his devoted followers were largely 
marginalized by the völkisch movement. In effect, Hitler would become a beacon for the völkisch 
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movement and the ultra-conservative nationalists that had dominated the right wing political 
sphere. Socially, Hitler would become a cult figure outside of his own personality cult due to his 
Putsch and the belief that he was a step away from the Weimar government and the Marxist left. 
This would therefore become a period of rebirth for the Nazi Party and a booming period for the 
Hitler cult. 3 
 
I. Reforming the Party 
After his release from prison, Hitler still had the problem of the banned party status to 
contend with verging on 1925. It would take a late January interview with a government leader 
and some meandering through the sociopolitical sphere of influence for the party to gain the 
ability to meet again, more importantly it would take Hitler portraying a tame politician and 
promises of assistance with fighting the Marxist threat. While given this chance to begin 
reforming the party, Hitler was still some blocks to his authority with his spoken presence being 
banned from much of Germany until 1927. His banning from public speech would become a 
boon for his cult of personality in dramatic ways, but it would cause a period of quiet years 
where the NSDAP would receive little mention outside of Nazi publications. During this 
reforming period, Hitler would steer his party towards cooperation and adoption of the 
democratic and constitutional methods. While a prison sentence would usually end the political 
career of hopeful candidates, Hitler did not suffer this fate thanks in part to his cult like status 
within the völkisch, ultra-conservative, movement.4 
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The greatest boon which assisted Hitler in reforming his party was his notoriety and the 
general perception of political myths that was entertained by Germans at the time. In the prior 
chapters we touched on the appeal Hitler had prior to, during and after his trial within the 
völkisch movement. What is most important in this is the role this appeal had on reforming the 
party and the growth of the cult of personality cult. With support from antidemocratic and secret 
societies, a level of myth had the chance to move a section of the population into the aims of the 
NSDAP and eventually the Hitler cult. The interwar period was full of totalitarian myths, with a 
belief not only in a necessary leader, but in an antisemitic worldview. What set Hitler apart from 
the rest was not only his ability to tap into the overarching disparities felt by the movement, but 
it would take a strong hand to reform the party into a force of presence for his political attempts 
at gaining a promising position in power. It was with this perception that the party would be 
reformed in the image of Hitler’s choice that would drive Hitler’s quiet years; and while Hitler 
did not have as many backers as others, including Ludendorff, during this period, it gave him the 
chance to create an image that would appeal outside if the ultranationalist movement.5 
After his release from prison Hitler himself needed a reimaging into a proper politician, 
so it was necessary to create a more assertive and progressive image in how Hitler dressed. 
While this had been done earlier in the history of the party, this reimaging was paramount to how 
Hitler would come to be perceived until the end of the Second World War. It also served as part 
of the function of how charisma was displayed publically to not only his followers, but also the 
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world. Three choices were presented for consideration, each serving an important function in the 
cult of personality and towards the general German public.6  
 
Fig 4: Hitler was redressed in three aspects: The völkisch nationalist, the technocrat, and 
the military leader. 
The first was the völkisch image in traditional lederhosen, which harkened back to a 
German past that promised a bright future. While this would have been a perceivable respect 
towards a Germanic past, it was not the image Hitler wanted to present. The second was the 
technocrat, a modern politician dressed in such a way that had Hitler appeared as part of the 
Weimar sociopolitical culture. This functioned well for his refined image, presenting him as 
someone other than a formerly jailed, failed revolutionary—instead he was appeared as a 
politician, lacking the völkisch and militarist traits that were dangerous to the overall credibility 
of the NSDAP. The third image was that of the military leader, which in order to appease the 
Weimar government in Bavaria he chose to avoid using during his quite period. Each appearance 
had a functional appeal to aspects of Germany Hitler wanted to appeal to as a charismatic 
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authority, but for the years 1925 to 1927, he chose to appear as a technocrat that would appeal to 
the wealthier classes in Germany. 7 
Though the reimaging of Hitler was important to understanding the wider appeal and 
appeasement of the German public and political spheres, there was still the fact that Hitler was 
unable to speak in public until 1927 to contend with. To counter this, the party needed to have a 
charismatic orator capable of delivering the party propaganda in Hitler silence. With many new 
members flocking to the party, though the numbers were not near their pre-Putsch amounts, the 
most standout orator was a young, disabled Ph.D. Joseph Goebbels, would become the voice of 
the party in Hitler’s silence. Goebbels himself was a capable orator and propagandist in his own 
right, but would fall into the Hitler cult slowly after reading about the Putsch. Goebbels began 
his time with the party in the Rhineland, and by 1925 he was a leading member and speaker of 
the NSDAP in the German North. While at first unimpressed by Hitler, after reading Mein 
Kampf he would see him in a different light. When the two met in February 1926, Goebbels was 
disappointed to find the two had little agreement on central party issues. At this time Goebbels 
received a stern dressing down by Hitler in a controlling and corrective argument and for a 
moment had the chance to lose faith in the cult of personality. While others would fall away after 
this, Goebbels was pulled further into the cult folds in April with a personal invitation to speak in 
Munich from Hitler. By watching Hitler berate party leaders from another northern region, 
Goebbels believed that Hitler was a brilliant individual due to his handling of the men—offering 
to ignore their slight as long as they submitted to his unconditional leadership within the party.8 
Goebbels would become one of Hitler’s most ardent supports, like Heβ, until their deaths. He 
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would hold Hitler atop a pedestal that none could knock him from. This was easily noted in a 
1927 speech where he described Hitler’s preordain mission as the great simplifier. “When Hitler 
speaks, the magic force of his words breaks all resistance,” and those that stood against his words 
were against his God given actions.9  
The quiet years were eventful for Hitler in his effort to reform the party under his 
unconditional control. The mystique of his presence combined with the spectacle of a trial would 
become important during this period for recruitment, but in every way it was his personal 
charisma that would draw Germans into the party. Much as it had with Goebbels, his charismatic 
authority would gain followers from many of the ultranationalist parties, especially after the 
recruitment of Goebbels as the main orator of the Munich party in Hitler’s silence. 
 
II. Growth of the Führer Myth: Nazi Organizations during the Quiet Years 
During his quiet period, the NSDAP would create two major sub groups under the cult of 
personality as they attempted to appear respectable in the eyes of the German Government. This 
attempt to appear respectable was more than just making Hitler himself appeared as though he fit 
in with the politicians; it was in making the cult of personality seem a presentable group of 
organizations, including their paramilitary arm. While multiple groups were part of the 
overarching party, the groups that grabbed the most attention were the militant and youth arms of 
the party.  
 Two of the most noteworthy the Schutzstaffel (translated: Protection Squadron, SS) and 
Hitlerjugend (Translated: Hitler Youth, HJ) were formed by the NSDAP in 1925 and 1926 
respectfully. While both of these organizations had appeared prior to the Putsch, their foundation 
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was not dated to the prior Putsch years. A discussion of the SS must begin with a short 
examination of the SA, a pre-Putsch paramilitary group discussed in the prior chapter, as the SS 
began as a sub group of the SA in these years. The SS functioned under the SA as the protection 
of the Führer, even after the resignation of Ernst Röhm as leader of the SA. While Röhm was 
gone, Hitler had Julius Schreck create the group since the brownshirts, the nickname of the SA, 
numbered near two thousand, but was loyal to Röhm before Hitler. The SS had several leaders 
though the years and would grow into a wing of the military that was responsible for a number of 
functions within the party. The SS was important as the militant arms of the political party, but 
during the quiet years it was a reasonable step for the political imaging of the party as the SS was 
less likely to fight in the German streets than their SA counterparts. The SS would become more 
important as Hitler gained political power and was able to implement Nazi reforms in place of 
the Weimar law, and would grown into a sectioned army of elite soldiers that would work 
various roles under the Führer. 10 
Although the SS was an important adult male organization, a party organization that 
would go on to feed into their group was formed for male youths to educate them in the Hitler 
cult. While not a function of the political arm of the party, the Hitler Youth organization would 
act as the socialization and indoctrination factor for young males as young as fourteen years old. 
A youth organization was not unheard of during the interwar period as it was common for their 
formation in Germany. These groups within the period were founded on a romanticized idealism 
of nationalist leadership which played directly into the Hitler myth and lead many youths to 
follow the cult like influence of Hitler and his NSDAP local leaders. This romanticized idealism 
also placed the groups at odd with the political scheming of the Weimar republic and the left-
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wing parties within it. This opposition played many youths right into the party of the charismatic 
orator and his cult. Much like the SS, the NSDAP youth organization was originally found in the 
year prior to the Putsch, but it was is rebranding and reformation in 1926 that would create the 
nature of the organization that would continue until the early Nazi regime. The generation that 
flocked into the Hitler Youth were different that the generation that controlled the government in 
several ways. Born between the turn of the century and the outbreak of the First World War, a 
group that included Heinrich Himmler, they were, “a generation of the unconditional, ready for 
anything,” that would fuel the Nazi Party particularly well.11  
The Hitler Youth had in time become a large organization under the Nazi Party, but this 
early on, it functioned as the indoctrinate arm in reeducating youths towards the Hitler cult. 
Effectively it was a propaganda arm of the Nazi Party, but also functionally an early aspect of 
their education program described in the 25 Point Program. This was one of the boons the party 
needed during this period, though it would not allow political gains, it did begin to ingrain the 
party into a position to influence the social organization of young men in their direction. These 
social ties would bear political fruit in the coming years, but it was successful enough during this 
period to begin to push young men into the Hitler cult. The years from 1926-1931 saw a youth 
revolt against the Weimar Republic that was the culmination of the feelings of the organized 
youths. Functionally, at least towards the upper teen membership, the Hitler Youth were 
important to influencing the universities in Germany. Unlike other nationalist youth 
organizations, even their parent party, the Hitler youths had a strange belief in socialism in this 
period before 1933 they, “formulated constructive policies of social, industrial, and economic 
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reform,” that aimed at restructuring the living standard of German working class youths.12 They 
were a nationalist socialist youth organization that idolized Hitler with near religious conviction, 
but while they were able to influence some aspect of the political sphere of influence, they were 
more importantly an arm of educating German youths in the propaganda of the Hitler cult.13 
The SS and Hitler Youth were not the only organizations from during Hitler’s quiet 
years, they were just the most well known in the post war period. Other organizations were 
formed to spread the propaganda and cult of personality. There were organizations to draw 
Germans of multiple classes into the charismatic authority of the personality cult. Included in 
these were trade and religious organizations, disabled veterans and civil services that connected 
into a web of groups that held Hitler to the highest regard as the central party leader. The least 
successful was an industrial trade group that could not pull membership from the Communist and 
Catholic trade unions, but one of the strangest was the women’s organizations. The importance 
of women was well documented during the period, but it was the nature of the party program and 
the traditional party values that set the NSDAP’s women’s organization apart from other 
sociopolitical groups. 14 
 
III. The Curious Case of Women 
A traditional look on women was not uncommon for the 1920s; while some were 
breaking gender roles, other held onto the traditions of previous generations and the separation of 
the home and work spheres down gendered lines. The Weimar Republic had passed many laws 
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that challenged the traditional gender roles by giving women the right to vote and feminist elite, 
but even before this, women were gaining positions in the workforce. Professional positions 
were a significant gain for women as the professions of music, teaching, and medical gained over 
110,000 women—with teaching taking the great bulk of the numbers. Though this advancement 
aligned with other modern nations, the völkisch traditions would fight against the liberation of 
the female sex. This was very much used as a function of the Nazi program, with the original 
program treating women as merely mothers of the next generation of males. It was important to 
the discussion of this paper that the question of the placement of women within the Hitler cult 
was addressed. 15 
The post-Pustch years did little to change the perspective of the party on the role of 
women. Antifeminism was a major aspect of the male party elite, with Hitler reassuring a 
delegation of Nazis that once in power, “every woman would have a husband.”16 Women were 
meant to remain in the house tending to the family affairs according to their ultra-conservative 
and traditional views, insisting that women were the mother of the volk and their importance 
within their party and future Reich was as mothers and wives. Party members, including Hitler 
and Goebbels, discussed women’s rights in a variety of disparaging ways; Hitler described it as a 
system of depravity, Goebbels reasoned it as causing women to lose their dignity. Instead women 
were meant in the eyes of the party to have their dignity and prestige as a function of their home 
life and the number of children, especially sons, they were able to produce. This would also 
function later in the regime as part of an ideal image of feminity within the Third Reich after 
1933. Until then, their role in the party therefore was counter to the liberal movement of the 
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Weimar government, but it was still an odd position for women who were close to the party. For 
Hitler’s party, their expectations of women were narrowed and traditional. It relied on the 
previous generations’ view of gender roles that had reflected not only sexist, but also racist 
ideology. 17 
Before discussing the cult of personality and its relation to women, this paper must first 
address Hitler’s views on women. Where women were important in a maternal sense in his 
words, he considered them to be unimportant outside of the role as breeders. He relied on a 
misguided belief in the polarity of gender, where women were weak and emotional—in need of a 
male, husband or father usually, to properly live. Most importantly, German women were meant 
to be measured up to the ideal Aryan maternal image. At first this approach appeared inflexible, 
but Hitler was reasonable enough to understand that women were necessary in the workforce and 
that his party would be unable to completely remove women from working conditions at least 
during this post-Putsch period. By using this, Hitler was able to attract two different groups of 
women: conservative mothers and rebellious daughters. Within his propaganda, written and 
oratory, Hitler placed emphasis on the theme of childbirth and its relation to racial purity and 
longevity. His propaganda called for women to be kept from politics, but oddly women still fell 
under the charismatic authority he projected in such strength that there was feminist Nazis 
attempting to coincide both ideologies. It is easy to see that the ideology would not be able to 
coexist from the perspective of the cult of personality, even when arguing from a sociopolitical 
perspective the gendered normative of the Nazi ideology was not capable of working outside of 
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the demand of the charismatic propagandist who, by this time, had worked to consolidate his 
solitary hold on the party. 18 
During his quiet years, the party role for women was one of multiple paradoxes. Women 
were expected to refrain from politics, but they also were necessary in gaining needed votes for 
the party during the elections between 1927 and 1933. Women flocked into the party and a 
political organization, the German Women’s Order (GWO), was founded in 1923 by Elsbeth 
Zander and was incorporated into the party in 1928. The GWO, “campaigned actively in public 
for the removal of women from public life: militantly anti-socialist, anti-feminist, and 
antisemetic.”19 Zander herself was a effective as a speaker, but was, in 1926, at odds with Hitler 
and the GWO would collapse due to economic issues in 1931. This was the most notable pre-
Chancellorship organization for female Nazis, and it marked part of the approach towards the 
party as politically, and socially moving, woman. While it was anti-feminist, this was not always 
the case, since feminists still were attempting to align the party goals with their feminist beliefs. 
The NSDAP’s approach lack rigidity for these and other reasons and in many ways there was no 
way to remove women from the public sphere, socially or politically.20 
The question still remains, why women would join the NSDAP for their antifeminist and 
ultra-conservative stance. Essentially, due to public distrust of the Weimar government and the 
charismatic appeal of Hitler, the party was able to gain its female membership. Women would 
flock to the cult of personality because Hitler was able to speak of things important to them, 
more importantly he was able to cross generational divides to draw in women of all ages. Their 
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participation in the Hitler cult, “was the most important feature of the movement,”21 as they 
would become the teachers and influencers of young German children. Therefore, their 
connection to the Führer was the most important to why they were loyal to the chauvinist 
movement.22 
The Nazi Party, especially concerning the cult of personality, was fundamentally 
misogynistic in its approach to women’s rights. While they were necessary for some aspects of 
the work force and essential for their democratic electoral jockeying, they were still consider 
only important in their role as the homely matron. The mystique of power, charisma, and the 
stress of the interwar period economic strains and political struggles combined with the 
sociopolitical need for a leader who would be able to lead Germany in the image of a heroic 
leader. For female supporters of the party, along with their male counterparts, Hitler was very 
much this person. His leadership cult was their devotion to this idea and to Hitler himself. 23 
 
III. Party’s Perception of Hitler 
Women were not the only member of the cult of personality as we have seen; his 
charismatic personality gave Hitler leverage in swaying Germans towards his party and his cult 
of personality. Some supports described meeting him, even for a moment at a rally, as like he 
was starring into their soul and would speak exactly what they wanted to hear. This was a major 
function of his charismatic authority and showed one of his main methods to gain the favor of his 
fellow party members and followers. Hitler was the main propaganda head of the party, approval 
of any plans laid with him. This was, in the eyes of his cult followers, the heroic leader that 
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would lead Germany from the clutches of disgrace. This was not always the case during the 
interwar period, especially in the post-Putsch period when Hitler was unable to control the 
movement from prison. Thus, in 1925, Hitler had moved to push his rivals in the margins of the 
völkisch movement. The SA was placed in a subordinate role to the party and forced to break 
with other paramilitary groups, with Röhm leaving the party and country in protest of this 
movement. His main rival in the movement was Ludendorff who was becoming extreme in his 
vocal views, attacking not only Jews, but also Jesuits and Catholics; this gave Hitler a stronger 
hold in the movement as attacking non-Jews was, “a recipe for electoral disaster in Bavaria and 
other pious parts of southern Germany.”24 In harming the reputation of Ludendorff, Hitler was 
able to make himself the central figure of the ultranationalist movement and, after demanding the 
supports of northern NSDAP leader Gregor Strasser, including Goebbels, to bend to his control, 
he had placed himself firmly in the control of the NSDAP.25 
In consolidating his power, many familiar rituals began to be used in the party. The most 
easily noted was the use of the Hitler salute (Heil Hitler) became obligatory, and by the 1926 
party rally, personal oaths of loyalties were made to Hitler and the yearly parade of the ‘Bloody 
Flag’ was done in remembrance, for nationalist and cult propaganda, of the 1923 Putsch. During 
his quiet years, Hitler feared speaking in public, or for long periods of time at party only events, 
with the idea of deportation being a likely scenario due to his Austrian citizenship. At this time, 
Hitler had need of a devoted follower who had a great understanding of propaganda and could 
work an audience similar to his own personality. To this end, Hitler found a favorite in the 
crippled vestige of Joseph Goebbels who had began to describe his adoration of Hitler in grand 
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terms in his private journal and showed his devotion clearly to his Führer. The cult of 
personality was invested in the power of Hitler with the rituals being used to show not only the 
mystique of the Führer, but also the solidarity of the movement within the Hitler cult. This in 
itself was indicative of the leadership of Hitler where he would focus on the propaganda and 
personality that would create his desires of power. 26 
With the arrival of 1927, Hitler had been given the right to speak in from of his party 
again. It was also the point where the NSDAP had a new basic structure with a younger 
generation of nationalist pushing the older, prewar generation to the side. These youths found 
their main leaders as inspirational in their activism and hate, since Hitler himself was, “only 40, 
Goebbels 32, Göring 36, [and Heβ] 35.”27 These youths would, in Hitler’s mind, go on to replace 
the previous Nazi activists and begin to mobilize under the party program and his own brand of 
propaganda. Goebbels described the devotion of the Hitler cult the best in a 1927 essay: 
The people have a fine sense of whether or not one is honest with 
them. Over the long run national instinct cannon be deceived if a 
man or a movement speaks differently than it acts, if it speaks 
differently than it thinks. There is no doubt about Hitler. One either 
rejects him absolutely or sees in him the only hope to reestablish 
the Reich. No one who has heard him has ever doubted that he 
believes the world view he represents.28 
 
With few in the party willing to openly deviate from Hitler’s desires for the party, it was 
easy for the cult of personality to flourish within the sociopolitical sphere of the interwar period. 
It would only take a range of even to give the cult the power victory its leader desired. In doing 
so it would also begin to breakdown the political structures of the Weimar Republic and its old 
guard leaders. 
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IV. Public view of Hitler 
 In understanding the pull of Hitler’s personality multiple points need to be made. First, if 
one did not feel like they could identify with the ideology professed by Hitler and his Nazis, then 
one would not feel compelled by his charisma. For Hitler, personality was the most important 
aspect of his propaganda and self image; this would function, in many ways, as his ability to gain 
loyalist in Germany and sympathizers outside of it. Second, if a person saw Hitler as an 
unremarkable individual, his oratory skills would have less of a pull on their personality and he 
would generally be perceived as either an inferior or non-threat. One foreigner described him as 
formless, “a man whose countenance is a caricature…He is inconsequent and voluble, ill-poised, 
insecure. He is the Very prototype of the Little Man.”29 Third, the voters of Germany at this 
time, while many held a belief that Germany had been stabbed in the back by the Weimar 
governments, they were supportive of certain powerful members and had a belief that thing 
could be looking up for the country as the economy began to recover and more favorable peace 
terms were in the works. This would have never allowed the NSDAP to flourish quickly even 
with supports from powerful social elites.30 
 Hitler’s new strategies in 1928, including addressing the party’s attention to local 
governments, would bring a respectability to the party it had not previously been known for, 
gaining support from previous untouched populous. Party membership rose as a result, although 
it was not strong enough to capture a more than minor percentage of votes on the national 
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scale.31 Hitler would focus his energies on propaganda, and with Goebbels publishing party 
essays in Der Angriff (The Attack), a paper he founded in 1927, Hitler’s character was addressed 
to Germans on the Nazi’s terms. Goebbels would address Hitler as a creative genius in his 
essays, arguing that political leaders were required to have a level of tactful instinct and the 
ability to implement it with purpose. In the same essay Hitler is treated in a love him or hate him 
respect, with Goebbels arguing that to believe in the charismatic authority of the Führer would, 
one must see, “his powerful human form [where] we see in this man the grace of fate made 
visible,” and a follower would need to hold to his words and ideals in order to be close to him.32 
Goebbels would write in 1932 an article that described the character of a dictator, in it he 
described for the paper’s audience a fascist leader’s responsibility and personality. “A 
dictatorship requires three things: a man, an idea, and a following ready to live for the man and 
the idea, and if necessary to die for them.”33 This opening left little to the dedication Goebbels 
expected of others towards Hitler, but it also gave the German public a reason to view him as the 
inspirational leader they would need in the trying times Germany, after 1929, would face.  
 The main group outside of the NSDAP that Hitler would need to address his image for 
was the Catholic Germans whose leaders saw Hitler in a negative light. Those against the Nazis 
in the church leadership were still antisemetic, but saw Hitler as anti-Christian and placed the 
party on the same level as communist. In Bavaria, a mainly Catholic state, it would lead Catholic 
voters to choose progressive candidates, including the aged Paul von Hindenburg, a war hero 
who was a conservative candidate with a liberal backing. To combat this, Hitler would distance 
himself from anti-Christian nationalists and spoke to crowds of Catholics of his deep religiosity. 
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He would argue that Germany was in a state of spiritual distress and needed a strong leader to 
lead them out of it. Regardless, the party and Hitler would not be able to shake the distrust of the 
Catholics until 1933. Appearing anti-Christian was less of a worry for the personality cult; rather 
it was a sore irritation to the cult. Hitler was seen as a needed leader within the cult, a heroic 
leader sent by the grace of divinity to lead Germany into a promised age of prosperity.  This 
image had the chance to appear Christ-like for some, Anti-Christ for others. At the end of it, the 
Catholic vote was little needed as the decade drew to a close. 34 
 
V. 1929: The Year the World Fell 
An international crisis appeared in 1929 after the booming economy that was enjoyed in 
America crumbled with the fall of the American Stock Market. German unemployment rose 
rapidly in the aftermath of the crisis, and the dependence of Germany on short-term loans to 
repay their respirations dues would means that the stock market collapse would lead to Germany 
folding, like other counties torn by the war, defaulting on their loans. The inability of the 
Reichstag to find a solution would lead to the first presidential cabinet being appointed as a 
function of Article 48. The use of presidential emergency decrees, as directed by Article 48 of 
the German constitution, had little effect on the strained economy and social unrest. Attacks on 
the old elites and the liberal parties would come from multiple fronts, with both the communist 
and nationalist jockeying for supporters. In all of this, “a large proportion of the population s 
seduced by the appeals of a charismatic leader,” had begun to flock to Hitler’s cult.35 In this way, 
the Great Depression had the effect of diminishing the support for the Weimar government 
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would lead to the country attempting to turn away from the short democracy it had lived. This 
was a perfect storm of events for the party and especially for Hitler. As the 1920s had drawn to a 
close, and the 1930s began with an international depression, the Nazi Party, and with it the cult 
of personality, were making steady gains. While the party would not be in a position of power 
for some years after the 1929 Stock Market Crash, it was a turning point for the history of the 
party much in the same way the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 had affected the organization. The 
sociopolitical turmoil would bring out the best and worst in humanity, and with it Germany had 
begun a shift towards war. 36 
 
VI. The Personality Cult: Edge of Power 
The years between the Putsch and 1933 were a period of growth for the personality cult. While in 
some respect the party would struggle, the personality cult gained key members and support 
organizations that would grant them a greater reach in German society. Politically, the cult of 
personality would provide propaganda that addressed the concerns of Germans and would draw 
some to their ranks. Socially, the cult of personality would influence the creation and 
membership of the Hitler Youth and multiple groups dedicated women. Children would 
increasingly become important to the party, and with it the traditional role of the maternal 
teacher in the home was stressed. Starting in 1927, a new form of propaganda would set the stage 
for the Hitler cult as the NSDAP held its first rally in Nuremberg. While not the overwhelming 
thrall that was depicted by Leni Riefenstahl that was filmed after Hitler became Führer, the 1927 
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rally was a big step for the party in terms of pomp and circumstance, as well as the deliverance 
of party propaganda.37 
 
Fig 5: (From Left to Right) Rudolf Heβ, Adolf Hitler, and Julius Streicher at eh 1927 
Nuremberg Rally. 
Though many leaders spoke at the rally, two stood out for the purposes of the personality 
cult’s propaganda and influence. The first, Joseph Goebbels, addressed party propaganda and its 
transformation into political organization. The idea that fueled the propaganda was directed at 
the spread of propaganda, and the way in which it developed. As with the idea of Hitler in Mein 
Kampf, Goebbels would argue that, “Propaganda does not need to be intellectual; it must be 
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effective,” and stated in such a way that the general mass would understand the simplistic 
meaning.38 In arguing the features of propaganda, Goebbels touched on two important concepts 
that had addressed the personality cult in light of the sociopolitical sphere of influence; 
propaganda was split in two methods, understanding and feelings, both depended on the words 
used to deliver the information, and the control of both was important to controlling the masses. 
For the cult of personality, the propaganda of feelings was the most important and influential 
when addressing the position of Adolf Hitler within the party. As the Führer, a myth of grandeur 
was presented, although Hitler was seen as the völkisch image of a leader within this same 
context. Hitler was the party; to be faithful to the party was to be loyal to Hitler.  This was 
necessary as a function of the Hitler cult, as it called for loyalty to the Führer above all else. 39 
Adolf Hitler had also addressed his party at the 1927 rally. His speech focused on the 
need of the people for a stronger government and for a living space, but also the need for a 
political faith and national images to bring Germans together. Stung though out his speech were 
tones of racial superiority, arguing that the democratic tendency of the Weimar government 
limited its abilities by following international demands. Hitler argued that the policies of 
internationalism were, “incapable of policies that could bring a rising population in line with its 
territory, or better said: the territory of the population.”40 While the issue of race was important 
to the cult of personality, within his speech Hitler would address nationalistic idolatry, in both 
image and idea. “We deceive ourselves if we believe that the people want to be governed by 
majorities. […] This people does not wish to lose itself in “majorities.” It does not wish to be 
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involved in great plans. It wants a leadership in which it can believe.”41 Unity at home was the 
goal that Germany, in Hitler’s view, should strive to gain. This unity must continue from the 
personal home of German citizens, into a national sense of worth. In arguing this, Hitler would 
state that Germans lacked a national flag that represented the people on a whole, but with 
thousands behind the Nazi flag, it finally had, “a symbol of national strength and power.”42 The 
Nazi flag was tied to the party and Hitler, so in stating this Hitler was arguing for the strength of 
their propaganda. The concept of this sort of propaganda was not uncommon, but for the cult of 
personality, it was another reminder of the Hitler myth that was tied to a distinct leadership ideal 
that the party had pushed since the pre-Putsch days.  
As the decade drew to a close, the belief that Germany needed a strong, charismatic 
leader to have faith in, this had been a point the party propaganda strived to show Hitler in. As 
the party head of propaganda, Goebbels was in a unique position to address the qualities of a 
leader. His central focus was on what he saw as the four man components a leader needed: 
character, will, ability, and luck. Character, in this regard, addresses style and behavior, and 
combined with will and ability, it had the chance to create a leader who would accomplish 
greatness. In politics he argued that they were necessary for a leader to be accepted by the 
masses, whereas those who lacked this were incapable to lead. The last trait, luck, was not 
thoroughly addressed in his essay, but easily described the happenstance behind Hitler leading 
the party. When Goebbels wrote this essay, it was in honor of Hitler’s fortieth birthday and not 
long after the Stock Market Crash, it had the briefest mention of the man himself, but had left 
                                                           
41 Rosenberg and Weiβ, “Adolf Hitler’s Speech at the 1927 Nuremberg Rally.” 
42 Rosenberg and Weiβ, “Adolf Hitler’s Speech at the 1927 Nuremberg Rally.” 
58 
 
 
 
little guess as to the main inspiration for the essay. This concept was useful in understanding the 
charismatic authority that Hitler held at the close of the decade. 43                        
Hitler’s ideology was reflected in his cult as the platform for spreading his propaganda to 
the masses. While the party program was addressed in broad terms and never fully flushed out 
clearly, it had an important function of mobilization the mass of the Nazis behind their Führer 
for better or worse. With the party amassing votes, the cult of personality was gaining traction as 
a function of Hitler’s political strengths. 44 
 
VII. Conclusion: Edge of Power 
As Orlow described, “Hitler’s deliberately schizophrenic leadership façade created a 
strong emotional bond between leader and followers,” that would only grow stronger as the party 
was set have the cult leader as the German Chancellor.45  Multiple rituals that were observed by 
the cult of personality had become common place in Germany after Hitler became chancellor of 
Germany, the most commonly seen was the Nazi salute combined with ‘Heil Hitler,’ but other 
aspects of the Hitler cult had become commonly accepted. The underestimation of Hitler’s 
charismatic authority and the appeal of the party during the Great Depression would lead to few 
seeing the strength of the party at the polls until it was too late.  Nazism was Hitlerism, and its 
unique path was a function of its leader’s sociopolitical demands and psychological 
understanding of human nature. His was a party of youthful energies, offering change that would 
address the needs of its followers in the most dangerous ways; it was also a party based on long 
held, nationalist ideals. The strain it placed on a national culture that was already in crisis would 
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push it to a breaking point by 1933. The formation of organizations, rallies, and rituals were all a 
part of the Hitler cult. Those fanatical followers, both leaders in the party and regular German 
citizens, all functioned as propaganda heralds for the party. In this role, the cult was placed to 
influence both the social and political spheres at key points to turn the general mass towards the 
party’s bating arguments. 46 
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Chapter 4: The Hitler Cult in Power 
 
 The elections of the early 1930s were an intense point for the German political landscape. 
With Hindenburg defeating Hitler in the presidential election after two rounds of ballots, though 
Hitler had gained over a third of the votes, cracks in the democracy of the Weimar Republic were 
more apparent. The Nazis had gained 230 seats in July 1932, and with that the Reichstag had a 
strong anti-parliament stance.1 One of the main reasons for this was unpopular decrees from then 
chancellor, Heinrich Brüning, which were meant to combat the economic woes of the country 
and the mismanagement of Hindenburg’s presidential reelection run. The policies implemented 
increased unemployment, and drove Germans into the waiting ranks of membership between 
anti-parliamentary groups such as the NSDAP and the German Communist Party (KPD).  
Brüning lost the support of the Reichstag and, after conflicts with Hindenburg, resigned his 
position—and with it his cabinet’s—before the final Reichstag vote. The following two 
chancellors, Franz von Papen and General Kurt von Schleicher, fared little better. It was under 
the chancellorship of Papen that the ban on the activity on the NSDAP paramilitary 
organizations, the SA and SS, which was instrumental the affairs of the Nazis taking control of 
Prussia.  After failing to bring the Nazis into a coalition government, and Hitler refused the 
president’s reluctant offering of the vice chancellorship, Papen was ousted from his office via a 
512-42 vote in the Reichstag. While in the move was legal, it is important to note that the move 
happened as Papen waited to be acknowledge with a presidential order to dissolve the Reichstag. 
With a great majority of the Reichstag favoring the two major opposition parties and the 
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ultranationalist fascist party not moving to support the other parties, the country was facing not 
only economic problems, but also political turmoil. 2 
 When Schleicher became chancellor, he had tried, “to gain support from labor unions, as 
well as the radical wing of the NSDAP represented by Gregor Strasser.”3 Schleicher was unable 
to gain Strasser’s support, with Strasser forced to resign on December 8, 1932, weeks before 
Schleicher himself would resign on January 28, 1933. Papen had been working in the 
background to smooth Hindenburg towards offering Hitler the chancellorship, with Papen 
assuring the president that he could control the man and Schleicher recommending Hitler for the 
position he now vacated. As Hitler became the German chancellor, the cult of personality gained 
a new level of prestige within the country.4 
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Fig 6: Election Poster for Hitler and Hindenburg from the March 1933 Reichstag election 
reads, “In the deepest need Hindenburg chose Adolf Hitler for Chancellor. You too should 
vote for List 1.” 
I. 1933 Triumph at Last 
 After the discussions between Hindenburg, Papen, and others to place offer Hitler the 
chancellorship, on January 30, 1933 offered the position most desired to Hitler. In doing so, he 
was acknowledging the power of the Nazi leader’s party in the Reichstag, but also did so with his 
presidential powers, a move that was not wholly democratic in its own right. Hitler, unlike the 
Italian fascist Mussolini, had not seized power; rather he had been giving the position due to the 
miscalculations and underestimation of political elitism within the Weimar government. Hitler 
had made his demands and plans clear for years, he would accept nothing less than the 
chancellorship and his party wanted to dismantle the democratic government. The refusal of the 
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lesser position of vice-chancellor in 1932 was a belief in the idea that his personality cult and 
charismatic mystique was tarnished by the action. In waiting for the chancellorship, Hitler was 
given the ability legitimately that would present him with the ability to implement his 
propaganda and personal ideology on a national scale.5 
 Although at first Hitler had been outnumbered by Papen’s fellow conservatives, with 
only two of the major positions being controlled by the NSDAP, the Ministry of the Interior, 
occupied by Wilhelm Frick, and the Reich Chancellery with Hitler, the Führer’s party was out 
numbered, but set in key positions within and outside of the presidential cabinet. Herman Göring 
had been given the role as acting Prussian Minister of the Interior, giving the party control of the 
largest section of the country. For the cult of personality, there was validity finally for the years 
of struggle the Führer had faced and the ideas of the social memory of a strong leader was being 
addressed albeit slowly. Richard Bessel described this transitional period, from just before the 
accession of Hitler to his final ultimate take over near six months later, as a period that had 
political intrigue at the top and social violence from the SA at the bottom. Most importantly were 
the actions of Hitler in the days that followed his appointment. A third, and final, election was 
scheduled for March 1933 to be followed by an enabling act, something that Hitler had been 
adamant for in his negotiations. The February before the vote was filled with events in support of 
Hitler and Hindenburg, but the most influential event of the period was the Reichstag Fire in the 
days before the vote.6  
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Election fever was alive again in Germany in February 1933, with the parties collecting 
voter support however they could. Goebbels was in high spirits using propaganda to gain support 
for his Führer and some German voters appeared ready to give Hitler a chance as the period was 
still in economic strains, with a surprising amount neutral as February started. Though many 
Germans outside of the Nazi reach had little care, others that had heard the vague promises 
without falling into the membership argued that it would not take long for Hitler to fall like the 
other chancellors as his promises were not achievable. This general pessimism was a realistic 
approach for the period, but with time the attitudes of Germans were becoming more positive. 
The March 1933 election was preceded by certain events that would play heavily into Hitler’s 
cult propaganda as well as strengthen the Nazi’s hold on power. The level of violence and 
intimidation by Nazi supporters towards rivals, especially Marxists, had continued during the 
months under the leadership of Göring and other state leaders, but this would not damage the 
influence of Hitler at this time. Economically, some of the policies that had prior chancellors had 
approved were successful and the Nazis were ready to capitalize on this as their own successes, 
but it was also the vehemently anti-Marxism of most Germans that would turned by the Nazi 
propaganda.7 
Even with gains in support, there were those against the party and its rhetoric that warned 
of Hitler’s personality cult and his power hungry nature. Arguing that Hitler would never 
relinquish the power given to him, these voices were no doubt correct, but in 1933 there was 
little stopping the Nazi Führer from his goals.  Whatever fear Germans had of Hitler’s 
chancellorship, they were all but ignored with a shocking event that played right into the plans 
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and propaganda of the NSDAP. On February 27, the Reichstag was set on fire and the man 
arrested professing his plot was Marinus van der Lubbe, a recent Dutch immigrant and 
communist. Upon hearing the news from Goebbels, Hitler had rushed with Göring to the 
building, believing the fire to be, “a signal of for a Communist uprising—a ‘last attempt’ as 
Goebbels put it, ‘through fire and terror to sow confusion,” to gain power for themselves.8 While 
the fire was fresh in the mind of Germans, Hitler was in placed to remove his biggest rivals with 
the emergency decree, ‘For the Protection of People and State.’  Called the Reichstag Fire 
decree, it granted Hitler the ability to suppress the KPD and, “[four] thousand Communists 
including virtually the entire party leadership were immediately arrested, beaten up, tortured and 
thrown into newly created concentration camps,” due to this suppression.9 The violence would 
continue and assist in the consolidation of power under the Führer as they began to restore order 
by decree throughout the German states. The election was cast on March 5, and the Nazis had 
gained a 43.9 percent of the vote, with nationalist coalition partners gaining an additional 8 
percent, and many non-voters of the previous years had come out to cast a protest vote for the 
Nazi Party. While they had only won 288 of the 647 seats, propagandist Goebbels called the vote 
a resounding success. Hitler had been described as the ‘People’s Chancellor,’ and his image, 
along with the aging Hindenburg, was used to push Hitler as endowed with the national values 
and the chosen hero that would bring back Germany’s strength.10 
The March 1933 election was the last held in Germany until after the Second World War. 
The Enabling Act was passed with a level of political maneuvering that had few against the act, 
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and Hitler speaking in the Reichstag on March 23, promising moral renewal in education, the 
media, and the arts, and that, he would leave the Reichstag and the presidency untouched. The 
Enabling Act granted Hitler a wide swatch of powers that would allow him to rule without 
presidential decree. Hitler would break his promise to the Reichstag and, in doing so, had 
become the sole person controlling Germany.11 
 
II. Propaganda: Image and the Enabling Act 
 The triumph of Hitler was in no doubt a great boon to the cult of personality, but 
the triumph was also owed to the propaganda and devotion of the supporters of the leadership 
cult. The Nazis were the youthful energetic party, especially compared to the aging members of 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the party that was blamed for the creation of the Weimar 
Republic and the Versailles Treaty. The NSDAP had the greater understanding of the use of 
propaganda and they had used it to full effect leading up to the seizure of power. The belief in 
Hitler became a secular style of faith, one that described the Nazi ideology as Hitlerism. Those 
who created the leadership placed, “heavy emphasis on Hitler’s many-sided ‘genius’ in 
public…and press,” but it a danger of ignoring his humanity in front of the masses.12  
On the eve of the seizure of power, the NSDAP was spinning their propaganda steadily 
against multiple parties, but the most central work could be seen in how they worked up Hitler to 
appear as a boon to Germany, a different chancellor than the previous others. Hitler had always 
emphasized the importance of personality and its connection to authority; in this his image was 
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of central importance as he attempted to consolidate all power in the nation under his sole 
control.  Ian Kershaw pointed out three central factors in how Hitler’s public image was 
addressed. Firstly, it was a function of the interwar period belief that remained strong that the 
Führer was a youthful energetic and dynamic leader who would change the course of the 
Germany that the Weimar government had placed them. This was due majority to the image shift 
began in 1925 that turned the failed revolutionary into one of the first rock star politicians, 
noticed by many,  but still a mystery to most followers. Secondly, those who stood outside of the 
part grossly underestimated the power of Hitler’s personality and the effectiveness of his 
propagandist. Both Goebbels were masterful tacticians in the realm of propaganda and could 
adjust their words and actions in a relatively short period of time. This underestimation was a 
factor in Hitler becoming chancellor, as cabinet members, including Papen, had argued that they 
could control Hitler as a political pawn and in doing so uses the tools and organizations of the 
party to the government’s advantage. Lastly, Hitler was touted as the long established 
conservative leadership that all but the left had embraced. Even those on the right who had not 
backed the NSDAP previously were swayed towards the party, apart from the previously 
discussed liberal and Catholic voters, as disillusionment with the government under prior 
chancellors had cracked the support. These three factors generated a perception of the personality 
of the Führer as the last remaining hope for a country plagued by problems, but it had to work 
within the democratic functions of the Weimar Republic, even in the underhanded politics of 
period.13 
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While the image of Hitler leading up to the seizure of power that the March 1933 election 
would grimly start, the first major propaganda of the period had appeared to fall directly into the 
lap of the party. The Reichstag Fire gave way to acts that had begun the seizure of power in 
earnest; Goebbels had orchestrated public propaganda that addressed the Reichstag Fire as an 
attack by the communist within Germany to overthrow the government. In alleging this as an 
attack, the NSDAP could position themselves not only as a legitimate party, but also garner 
support for the emergency decree and the subsequent Enabling Act. At universities and on the 
streets, the Hitler cult would spar against the counter elements of the country, with the Enabling 
Act allowing for what had become a single party system. The fear of Marxist and communists 
controlling the country had those from the independent conservative right to the center-left 
leaning to lean away from the far left party, though trade unions would remain supportive of the 
KPD. Hitler, in his only occasion participating in a parliament debate, would smooth the nerves 
of those who were still on the fence in a peach to the Reichstag when presenting the Enabling 
Act vote arguing that the promises of 1918 were divisive lies that had ripped the country apart. 
Hitler understood that in order to get what he wanted his words would have to acknowledge the 
propaganda that the remaining member of the Reichstag parliament wanted to hear, and he had 
addressed that with practiced grace.14  
The following spring and summer of 1933 were filled with the NSDAP influencing the 
sociopolitical organizations to coordinate and begin indoctrination of the German populous. The 
Enabling Act gave Hitler the ability to do so without consulting the president or Reichstag. Thus, 
Hitler to begin consolidating power into his sole control, bringing more into his cult of 
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personality, and while he was pressured to act on the racial question of his Third Reich, it would 
not change the strong impact the consolidation would bring to the NSDAP and Germany The 
Enabling Act allowed the dismissal of scientists and professors, including Albert Einstein and 
Erwin Schrödinger, from prominent positions as part of the purge of the intelligentsia in order to 
have the education system at all level teach loyalty to the Führer cult and the, now defunct, 
racial history and sciences that were pushed by the Nazis.  Some willingly left the country in the 
face of the anti-intellectualism and racial violence that had broadened under Hitler’s unrestrained 
chancellorship. Outside of the education profession, censorship would force away artist, authors, 
and actors who did not fit into the Nazi propaganda or opening balked at it; newspapers were 
censored or outright banned unless under party controlled.15 
 Though much planning had gone into the propaganda presented in the wake of Hitler’s 
chancellorship, it was the sociopolitical realm that the Hitler cult represented much of the 
targeted area and assisted in transitioning the areas into supportive entities. Propaganda had 
always been a key tool in the NSDAP prior to their accession of power and the cult of 
personality had groomed a healthy obsession with the presentation of the leadership myth that 
had been important during this transitional phase of the interwar period. When discussing their 
impact it was important to understand that organizations previously under the NSDAP, such as 
women’s groups. The most noticeable as the period went on was the Hitler Youth as it became a 
requirement, like other groups, for boys and young men to join. The Hitler Youth would feed 
into the military, including a Hitler Youth section of the SS for older teens. Hitler was a central 
figure for the teens, as shown by an introduction to the handbook for the 10-14 year olds, which 
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stated that they bore Hitler’s name,  “happily and proudly, and know  that this name is an 
obligation.”16 This introduction was dedicated to an abridged biography of Hitler in which he is 
treated as the model they were meant to measure against. Their propaganda was meant to hold 
the Führer, in the highest regard to grow up and fight in his name for the German Reich.17  
 
Fig 7: Propaganda posters: 1) “Führer, we will follow you;” 2) “We stand with the Führer. 
The oath of the German people on 29.3 (March 29);” 3) “Adolf Hitler’s youth attends 
community schools.” 
 
III. Consolidation of Power: The Night of the Long Knives 
The consolidation of power did not solely rest on the public‘s perception of the NSDAP, 
but also on how the military perceived the party and their militant organizations. While 1933 was 
a year of bringing the public to the party, the military was difficult to bring under Hitler’s 
control, though not entirely so. The need to strengthen Hitler’s control had been addressed in 
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1934 under mounting pressure on the party image that had started to stain his own public image. 
Reports began to arrive at Vice-Chancellor Papen’s office of the brut violence of the Nazis on 
German streets. The overt violence of the SA was a major point of complaints for the reports, 
with, “Papen’s press secretary Herbert von Bose was beginning to establish active contact with 
critical generals and senior officers worried about the activities of the SA.”18 Prior to this point 
Hindenburg had acted as a mitigating voice between the two, but faced with illness in April 
1934, the worries of the military would become omnipresent within the country. As Hindenburg 
retired to his estate, the military and general public had begun to criticize the NSDAP. The lost 
enthusiasm had begun to bring the criticism towards Hitler with fears of disorder from the SA’s 
to the point that party leaders, including former SA head Göring and SS leader Heinrich 
Himmler, agreed to a purge of the less savory, and more rebellious, elements of the NSDAP. 
Soon after Hitler’s hand was forced with Papen addressing the public on June 17, 1934, to warn 
against a second revolution and attacked the personality cult as culpable in its creation.19 
In addressing this, Papen had given the party a measure of worry about the perception on 
the role of the leadership cult in the country. The concerns of the public and military would push 
the party into a consolidation effort against Ernst Röhm’s SA and political rivals on June 30, 
1934. Called the Röhm Putsch and Night of the Long Knives, this purge would had the effect of 
removing the most of the socialist elements, of which members of the SA argued for, from the 
party. With the capture of power these same members became a weakness within the party and 
the June morning saw the arrest or execution of many of its members. Röhm himself was given 
the option the next morning to either commit suicide or be executed in the name of Hitler. His 
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death at the hands of the SS would curb the remaining socialist elements of the party. Outside of 
the party, political rivals, including communists were arrested, tortured, executed, or sent to the 
newly created concentration camps. Papen and his two secretaries were arrested, with only Papen 
being released and later to be demoted to the role of a German ambassador. What remained of 
the SA would become a subordinate organization to the SS.20 
Within the party, violence was a major factor in the submission of the country and was 
not hidden entirely from view. The SA stood as the main example of this violence and its 
membership, recruited by and loyal to Röhm, were an early function of the NSDAP’s party 
violence. As the first militant arm of the movement, the SA were known for two major things 
within the interwar period, their uniform of brown shirts and their street gang nature that had 
violently clashed with the militants of the KPD on German streets. The violent extermination of 
the socialist sympathies within the party structure served to be a centralizing force under the 
Führer myth, for at the core of the party was a violent nature. The personality cult that 
surrounded the Hitler had been threatened by the Röhm’s SA and for all the assistance they had 
in Hitler gaining Chancellorship, the threat they presented in his desire to control the German 
military had placed them against Hitler’s desires.  The Nazis had little criticism in the murders of 
the Röhm Putsch, with some observers arguing that the action had been too mild. Hitler had 
found a resurgence of cult fervor and all around return of enthusiasm for his role as the leader of 
Germany. Thus, the Röhm Putsch was a great boon to the propaganda of the movement and the 
cult of personality.21 
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IV. Führer Hitler: Germany’s Sole Leader 
 President Paul von Hindenburg died on August 2, 1934, leaving a vacancy that Adolf 
Hitler was more than happy to occupy.  At first Hitler had combined the position of chancellor 
with the presidency, but by August 19, he dissolved both positions in favor of a single title, 
Führer, claiming that, “[the] title of Reich President…was ‘inseparably united with,’” 
Hindenburg.22 Seemingly over a short period of time, Hitler had become the sole leadership 
within the Reich and in maneuvering and threatening their way, the NSDAP was the only party 
left in Germany. The propaganda that surrounded the leadership myth was extended in the wake 
of Hindenburg’s death, centered on strengthening the connection of the people to their leader. 
The first instance of this was mere hours after his death when all members of the military were 
required to swear a new oath of loyalty to Adolf Hitler; weeks later it would be updated and 
pressed upon the civil servants as well. The oath to the Führer was important to understand the 
extent the party was attempting to control the country early in their seizure of power.23 
 Hitler was cemented as the leader of Germany, but his leadership was not as smooth as 
the party had wanted it to appear, with some voters, up to a third in certain voter districts not 
approving of Hitler during the March 1933 election, remaining steadily against the party and 
Hitler himself in the wake of a referendum on his assumption of full power. This was a snap 
back against the idea that Hitler had united a divided people that the state propaganda had 
argued, due to the nature of the remaining economic issues. Not long before the referendum vote, 
Heβ had spoken in terms of loyalty towards Hitler, arguing that he was the only leader able to 
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bring the nation out of its conditions. His statements derived from a point of emotion with a 
strong belief in a divine providence, much as Hitler himself argued, that lead Hitler to this point 
as the salvation of Germany.24  Most clearly was the statement that: 
And surely it was providence that preserved the life of the old 
Field Marshall and Reich President to enable his good name and 
protecting hand to guard the young National Socialist government 
until Adolf Hitler’s abilities as a leader had been proven to 
everyone at home and abroad, until his reputation was sufficient to 
assume the full leadership of the Reich.25 
 
  It was with these issues that the 1934 party rally in Nuremburg had occurred. In an effort 
to show the Führer in the strongest light, his usual central role was extended and the strength of 
the party was expounded to the greatest extents. As with previous years, the party rally portrayed 
the Hitler cult in the grandest of ways, but this year it was intended to appear to the world as 
though the entire nation was devoted to the Führer and his ideals. This act of propaganda would 
be forever immortalized in the film, Triumph of the Will.26 
 Turning to Hitler’s leadership style, it was clear that his, “way of operating was scarcely 
conducive to ordered government.”27 This was made abundantly clear by his leadership after 
1933. Hitler was not a bureaucrat, preferring to leave the running of the government to his inner 
circle on most occasions, especially as the interwar period continued. As the Führer, his 
leadership and words were unquestionable; in practice his actions as sate head were few and far 
between after 1933. He was a symbol of action, and those who were in place to make political 
choices, no matter how small, within the government were part of the cult that believed in the 
idea that was roughly, ‘what would the Führer do.’ Even with the praise of the Hitler cult, 
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especially the words of Deputy-Führer Heβ, it was clear that Hitler did not have the patience or 
care to focus on the bureaucracy of leadership; instead he preferred the propaganda of the myth 
and his personal image both in Germany and internationally. Though, when Hitler chose to focus 
on the bureaucratic position of his role, he preferred to rule without outside influences, preferring 
to deal with his inner conviction in regards to his personal leadership.28 
 Regardless of his conviction to lead the nation’s bureaucracy, Hitler did not abandon his 
desires to control all of Germany and have his will imposed upon it. The cult of personality 
would spread through the country slowly in the coming years, as the interwar period came to a 
close it would deal dangerous blows to the social, political, and economical freedoms of those 
viewed as undesirables. As the sole leader of Germany, Hitler had become the central figure to 
the nation, under the guise of unity and nationalist progress. 
 
V. Triumph of the Will 
 The most well known expression of the Hitler cult in propaganda was not presented by a 
party member, but commissioned by Hitler in lieu of his chancellorship. By filming the 1934 
party rally, Hitler and Goebbels intended to display the spiritual unity of the Nazis to Germany 
and world, but in choosing the director, Leni Riefenstahl, Hitler and Goebbels were at odds. 
Riefenstahl had never joined the party and was a woman, Goebbels assumed that as the 
propaganda head he should have been given the honor. Hitler had the final say and Riefenstahl 
gained the commission and all necessary resources. Hitler had chosen the name of the film in 
reference to the triumph of his personal will and charisma. In filming with thirty camera, 
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Triumph of the Will, was a glorious creation of the propaganda of the cult of personality, with 
Hitler portrayed, nearly always alone and from a lower angle, as a, “flawless, almost Godlike 
leader.”29 Riefenstahl had used a crew of 120 people and deployed new techniques, including 
telephoto lenses and wide-angle photography to accomplish the film. It served an altered reality 
that only videography could provide.30 
 
Fig 8: A Screen short from Triumph of the Will (1935) 
 Triumph of the Will portrayed Hitler and his personality in a dominant, ritualistic 
position. The entirety of the film speaks strongly of a propagandist style that was artistic, though 
not clearly veiled. Riefenstahl, herself, never described it as propaganda, though the footage 
filmed from September 4-10, 1934 and commissioned by master propagandist and NSDAP 
leader, Hitler, had in all pretenses been used as party propaganda worldwide. In the scope of 
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perspective, the film was captured to have the viewer feel as though they were part of the rally, 
with Hitler in the central role viewed from below. The overt political content presented was 
aimed at conveying, “the message of Hitler’s unchallenged legitimacy and authority over both 
the party and Germany itself,” and in the wake of the Röhm Putsch Hitler’s authority, “needed to 
be sealed in the minds of both party and nation.”31 It portrays the personality cult as deeply loyal 
and obedient to their Führer, and presented Hitler as the rescuer of Germany from the 
sociopolitical chaos of the Weimar period. In doing so it presented a select number of speeches, 
with the most from Hitler, that presented the party in a honorable and strong stance, removing all 
ideas of socialism connected to the party. The ritualism displayed in the film are similar to 
Christian idolatry, with the ‘bloody flag,’ the NSDAP flag present at the Beer Hall Putsch, used 
as a sort of blessing on newer party banners and the crowds repeatedly yelling ‘sieg heil,’ was 
intended to show a fanatical devotion to not only German and its single party, but more 
importantly to its Führer, Adolf Hitler. The mass crowds presented in the film were meant to 
show, on a substantially exaggerated scale, the devotion of the Hitler cult to the Führer. It 
certainly had the appearance of presenting the party in the grandest of lights, hinting at a great 
unity across social classes, but also showing that Germany had, ‘One People, One Nation, One 
Leader.’ 32 
 
VI. Olympics as a Stage 
 Two years prior to Hitler’s appointment as chancellor, Berlin had been awarded the honor 
to hold the 1936 Olympic Games.  The games had been granted in a tight vote to Berlin under 
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the Weimar Republic, but with Hitler becoming chancellor and the racist ideology that welcomed 
into prominent government, the city hosting the games was in jeopardy. The games had been 
pitched to Goebbels, then Hitler, in a propaganda sense, with both seeing the potential in them, 
especially the Summer Games where innovations in the opening ceremony were used. The year 
before in 1935, the Nuremburg Laws had been approved classifying what the Regime perceived 
as a Jew, a personal with at least 1 in 4 grandparents being deemed Jewish by heritage or faith, 
and prohibiting the intermarriage between Aryan Germans and Jews. Those identified as Jewish 
were deemed non-German and, in regards to sports, disallowed in national sports organizations. 
Instead, Jewish organizations were created, and many of the German athletes were of Jewish 
decent, leaving a large hole in the sports domain of qualified athletes for the 1936 Olympics. 
“The Nuremburg Laws were presented in the press as a stabilizing measure that would help the 
Jewish Minority in German y to Settle down to living it own life,” but this would cause a 
question of morality in terms of participation in the Olympics.33 While the idea of morality 
addressed, no country invited chose to miss the Olympics, but the Nazi Party chose to roll back 
on their openly displayed antisemitism as the games neared—though this did not affect the 
campaign against the cultural minorities of the Roma and Sinti.34 
 With the ‘Olympic Pause’ in set for the two weeks of the Summer Games, the attention 
of the party was turned towards the propaganda of the large event. For the Nazis, the term ‘the 
whole world a stage,’ was far from meaningless, instead they had turned the opening ceremony 
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into a, “stunning act of propaganda [that] would be emulated by all subsequent Olympics.”35 
Hitler and his Propaganda Minister, Goebbels, understood that in presenting their own twists on 
the opening had the chance to influence the global perspective on Germany, and did as much as 
they could to control the athleticism of Germans as part of their indoctrination programs. To this 
effect, all sports organizations were disbanded and, as stated, Jewish athletes were forced into 
Jewish organizations. Adult organizations were, by 1938, all subsections of the Nazi Party and 
had their structure forcefully changed by the party. On the first day of the Summer Games, all 
German youth athletic organizations outside of the Hitler Youth were disbanded, which pushed 
children from 10-18 years of age into the indoctrination program of the Hitler Youth if they 
wanted to participate in competitive sports. While national and international politics were 
expected, by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the party blatantly ignored the idea in 
favor of projecting their ideology and growing power to the world. This was easy to do as it was 
the first Olympics broadcasted internationally thanks to technology that the nation, under the 
control of Hitler, had put into the event.36 
 All around the city, the antisemetic messages and imagery were removed, leaving Berlin 
virtually white washed of the ill of normally on show. Within the Olympic stadium, Nazi flags 
were flown beside Olympic ones and a German eagle clasping the Olympic rings in its talons 
was the symbol of the event. Hitler, during the opening ceremony made a grand entrance, and it 
was easy to note that the entire event was about Hitler and his personality cult, regardless of the 
international event. The most memorable, and lasting, feature of the opening ceremony was the 
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lighting of the Olympic touch relayed from Greece by runners, with a silent and intense pause 
between the arrival of the runner and the lighting of the flame.37 
 Although the Olympics served a pause in the Nazi power gambit, with the Rhineland 
being remilitarized in March between the Games, ultimately it did not change the course of 
German remilitarization or its charge towards war. The event displayed the Hitler cult to the 
world and attempted to influence international perspectives in believing that all of Germany was 
behind their Führer, and with the 1936 Party Rally soon after, this was one of the first instances 
where Hitler was openly displayed in a mystic sense. Soon after the Olympics were over, the 
party would continue and increase their abuses towards the country’s Jewish population.38 
 
VIII. Conclusion: The End of the Interwar Period and the Cult of Personality 
After the seizure of power, Hitler was soon in control of the national government. It 
would not take long for the party to begin implemented their antisemetic aims and political 
ideology into the lives of all Germans.  While the questionable nature of the effectiveness of the 
indoctrination was reasonable, there is no doubt that the party was effective in strengthening the 
cult of personality after the 1936 Olympics. With party leaders arguing their great 
accomplishments as Germany had received Hitler as a leader and through his leadership had 
been transformed. “The German nation and its soul belong to Adolf Hitler and his party,” Robert 
Ley would proclaim in November 1936, and there was little doubt that Hitler would not let it go 
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without a fight.39 With Hitler’s leadership, his need to control every aspect had become more 
apparent, as did the use of violence to bring order within the nation. Hitler and the party had 
begun to address his personage in pseudo-religious tones, as the Führer he was near infallible 
and the image of a heroic leader.40 
 In the lead up to the Second World War, the party began to expand the military, an act 
that went against the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler assumed that he had considered all of the 
possible actions, but the tension was high between military leaders, with their body split between 
blind trust in the Führer and those more pragmatic who saw the danger of going against the like 
of Great Britain with the declaration. Nevertheless, his political aims for the military, “depended 
on Great Britain’s cooperation,” and avoiding an early two-front war.41 A policy of appeasement 
would persist until the beginning of the Second World War, with the interwar period seemingly 
reinforcing the image of the Führer cult as a militaristic, ever present entity. Hitler’s personality 
was interesting in regards to his leadership style, roughly removed from the majority of it, he 
instead preferred to spend his mornings in his room listening to what he called his “inner 
conviction” for leadership advice as no one was to appear to have influence over him. His 
charismatic leadership, while odd to those outside of the cult, was unquestionable to his cult of 
personality. The Hitler cult would follower their leader, nearly unquestionably, into whatever 
abyss he would take them.42
                                                           
39 Robert Ley, “Fate—I Believe! (1936),” trans Randall Bytwerk, German Propaganda Archive, (2002). 
40 The Dark Charisma of Adolf Hitler; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth;’ Keys; Mommsen; Evans, The Third Reich in 
Power. 
41 Rolf-Dieter Müller, “The Military in the Totalitarian Führer State,” in Hitler’s Wehrmacht 1935-1945, (University 
Press of Kentucky, 2016). 
42 The Dark Charisma of Adolf Hitler; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth;’ Müller; Evans, The Third Reich in Power; 
Geoffrey Megargee, “History-World Wars: Hitler’s Leadership Style,” BBC (March 30, 2011). 
82 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
The personality cult was inseparable from the personage of Hitler, especially once he had 
gained complete control of Germany. After the Anschluβ, the 1938 annexation of Austria, Hitler 
would state, “In the Future I want to be nothing other than what I have been in the past: alerter of 
my people, teacher of my people, and the Führer of my people.”1 This had described his desires 
since taking control of the party almost two decades prior, but also the idealism that had begun to 
intrude upon the practicality of leadership within the movement. The deliberate vagueness of the 
party platform in 1925 meant that as the party evolved and transitioned, it would remain central 
to the party aims. The Nazi propaganda, especially once under Goebbels had a sense of cynical 
dishonesty that, “received a significant boost from the cult of irrationality that drove their 
followers,” who rebelled against standards of rationality and saw a certain level of reason as a 
chronic ailment of democracy.2 Hitler was viewed as a national salvation within the 
sociopolitical propaganda, set to lead in the idealized ethnic cleansing of not only his nation, but 
all of Europe. His unquestionable position within the party had him held as the sole orator of 
party orthodoxy, and with this he had cultivated a level of personal loyalty from his party which 
he had used mercilessly should a crisis arise.3 
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Fig 9: 1938 poster issued after the Anschluβ, it reads: “One People, One Reich, One 
Führer.” 
 When looking at the effect that the rise of Hitler had on the period, it can be simple to 
ignore the wide range of impact that his cult of personality had outside of the political sphere of 
influence. The social welfare of the country aside, the function of hate and propaganda addressed 
the desires of a wounded populous that distrusted the democratic process and the government 
they blamed for their plights. Adolf Hitler was certainly a believer in providence; much in the 
sociopolitical scope of influences would attest to some sense of providence. While chance may 
have played a role in his assignment to watch the party in 1919, it was an understanding of 
human nature and the use of charismatic authority that would allow him to rise in the interwar 
period. 
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This thesis sought to examine the role the cult of personality that surrounded the public 
image of the NSDAP, also known as the Nazi Party, leader Adolf Hitler was influenced by the 
social factors of interwar period Germany and the political policies and failures of the First 
World War and the Weimar Republic. Through discussing the various events, people, and most 
importantly propaganda, an understanding of the Hitler cult was formed and cultivated though 
the various chapters. While not all Germans were part of the Hitler cult, the cult had connections 
within all aspects of life and no German would remain untouched by its reach.  
85 
 
 
 
Appendix: Interwar Germany Timeline 
 
1918 
• November 9—The abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm was subsequently folowed by the 
declaration of the Weimar Republic. 
• November 11—The First World War oficialy ended, an armistice between alied powers 
and Germany occured at five am, with ceasefire issued at eleven am that day. The hours 
between saw troops withdrawal from the Western Front, with the occupation of the 
Rhineland taking place folowing the armistice. 
1919 
• January 5—The German Worker’s Party (DAP) was formed. Among the founders were 
Anton Drexler and Dietrich Eckhart. 
• January 18—Neggoations began for the Treaty of Versailes. 
• June 28—The Treaty of Versailes was signed. 
• September 12—Adolf Hitler, a corporal in the reduced Germany army, was sent to spy on 
the DAP. 
1920 
• February 24—The DAP was oficialy renamed the National Socialist German Worker’s 
Party (NSDAP), though it was generaly shortened to Nazi Party. At this same meeting, 
the 25 Points was adopted as the oficial party program. 
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1921 
• July 29—Hitler, after threatening to leave the party, forcefuly negotiates his way into 
party head. This was the oficial moment when the party began to caled him Führer, 
though it was a title his loyal folowers had used since 1920. 
• November 4—The Sturmabteilung (SA) was formaly founded as the strong arm of the 
party. Unoficialy, they were formed in 1920 as the party militia and caled brownshirts 
due to their uniform tops. 
1923 
• November 8—With rushed planning, the notorious Beer Hal Putsch happened. The 
aftermath would lead to the party nearly crumbling, Hitler and other leader waiting in 
prison charged with prison, or hiding, while other members fled the country. Years later 
this event would be remembered by the Nazi Party in a ritualistic sense yearly. 
1924 
• February 26—The trial for the Putsch leaders began. Hitler would use the space to make 
himself and his movement out to be martyrs for the nationalist movement. Hitler, for his 
part as leader of the failed Putsch, was sentenced to five years in prison, but would only 
serve ten months of the sentence before being paroled. During this time He wrote Mein 
Kampf. 
1925 
• April 4—The oficial formation of the Schutzstafel (SS). Unlike the SA, they wore black 
shirts and first became Hitler’s personal bodyguard. 
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1926 
• July 4—The reorganization and oficial formation of the Hitler Youth (HJ) as the male 
youth (14-18) part of the SA. This would spread the Hitler Cult into the influential ranks 
of a generation that came of age under the Weimar government and were not scared by 
the First World War.  
1927 
• August 20—The first annual party conference to be held at Nuremberg, with al 
subsequent annual meeting being held in the city folowing this. These ralies would 
become important to the overal Führer myth and the international perception of the 
Hitler cult. 
1929-1930 
• The Great Depression occured and, in Germany, began to change the tide completely 
against the parties that had dominated the Weimar Republic for the majority of the 
interwar period. 
• In 1930, the Hitler Youth was branched out to included boys as young as ten and girls 
from 10-18. This would function as a way to further indoctrinate the generation into the 
folds of the cult of personality and charismatic authority of Hitler. 
• September 1930—The first major gains at the pols as the NSDAP gained 18.3 percent of 
the Reichstag vote, becoming the second largest party. 
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1932 
• July—The NSDAP became the largest party after the vote for the Reichstag gave them 
over 37 percent of the vote. This would be the claim needed for the party to place Hitler 
into the Chancelery. 
1933 
• January 30—President Hindenburg begrudgingly appointed Hitler to the chancelorship, 
with Franz von Papen assuring the president that he and his alies could control the Nazi 
leader. 
• February 3—Hitler would define the foreign policy of the party with a term that would 
drive their expansion policies during the Second World War with the concept of 
lebensraum. 
• February 27—The Reichstag Fire occurred, which alowed Hitler to push though policies 
that banned the German Communist Party (KPD). This would give the NSDAP the clear 
majority in the Reichstag and would lead purging s by the SS on the membership of the 
KPD. 
• March—Hitler would order a new election, similar to the ones that granted the NSDAP 
their position, and the results would grant more votes towards the party. The Enabling 
Act, a policy pushed through because of the Reichstag Fire, would alow Hitler to act 
without consulting the Reichstag for four years. 
• April 26—With the formation of the Gestapo with members of the Prussian police under 
the control of Göring, the NSDAP was able to form a separate secretive police force. The 
party also gained control over local governments which would further establish the cult 
of personality into the German social sphere. 
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• May 10—In an act of propaganda, Goebbels encouraged the burning of 25,000 books 
deemed to be un-German. This would begin a worrying trend that would lead to 
furthering the demands of Hitler within the social sphere by Hitler. 
• July 14—Al other parties banned, leave the NSDAP as the only choice politicaly. A 
concept began to form that to be German meant to be a supporter of the Nazi Party, the 
be a great German meant to be a member of the party. 
• October—Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and began the process of 
breaking the terms of the Treaty of Versailes. 
1934 
• June 30—The Night of the Long Knives, or the Röhm Putsch, lead to the death of 150 
SA leaders including a member of Hitler’s inner circle, Ernst Röhm. While held as 
purging of immorality from the party, it was also a final way to purge socialist demands 
from the party. 
• August 2—With the death of President Hindenburg, Hitler became both president and 
chancelor of Germany. He would merge both positions and adopt on a national front the 
title Führer. 
1935 
• February -March—The Luftwafe was established and the expansion of the German 
Army was announced in defiance of the Treaty of Versailes. 
• September 15—The Nuremberg Laws were enacted leading to citizenship laws that 
would further the Aryan exceptionalism that fueled Hitler’s cult status. 
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1936 
• March—Hitler sent troops to reoccupy the Rhineland, previously taken from Germany. 
• August 1—The opening of the Summer Olympics in Berlin lead to a display of the cult of 
personality in the propaganda of the opening ceremony. It would also cool antisemitism 
within the country for the period of the Olympics. 
• October-November—Germany would gain alies in the form of Italy and Japan that 
would persist through the Second World War. 
• December—Membership in the Hitler Youth became compulsory for al boys. 
1938 
• March 14—Hitler entered Austria, his former home, in what became known as the 
Anschluss, without resistance from Austrians. 
• September 30—the Munich Agreement would give Germany the Sudetenland in 
exchange for peace. Less than a year later he would invade Czechoslovakia and Poland 
begin the Second World War. 
• November 1938—Kristalnact, the destruction of Jewish shops and synagogues, would 
begin the ramping up of anti-Jewish propaganda and violence. 
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